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FedAccounts: Digital Dollars
John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks*
ABSTRACT
We are entering a new monetary era. Central banks around the world-
spurred by the development of privately controlled digital currencies as well as
competition from other central banks-have been studying, building, and, in
some cases, issuing central bank digital currency ("CBDC").
Although digital fiat currency is one of the hottest topics in
macroeconomics and central banking today, the discussion has largely over-
looked the most straightforward and appealing strategy for implementing a
U.S. dollar-based CBDC: expanding access to bank accounts that the Federal
Reserve already offers to a small, favored set of clients. These accounts consist
of entries in a digital ledger-like other digital currencies-and are extremely
desirable, offering high interest, instant payments, and full government back-
ing with no limit. But U.S. law restricts these accounts to an exclusive clientele
consisting primarily of banks. Privileged access to these accounts creates a
striking asymmetry at the core of our monetary framework: government-is-
sued physical currency is available to all, but government-issued digital cur-
rency (in the form of central bank accounts) is not.
This dichotomy is unwarranted. Congress hould authorize the Federal Re-
serve to give everyone-individuals, businesses, and institutions-the option
to maintain accounts at the central bank. We call these accounts FedAccounts.
Unlike the CBDC approaches currently under discussion, which would use
complicated and inefficient distributed ledger technology and be walled off
from the existing system of money and payments, FedAccounts would be
seamlessly interoperable with the mainstream payment system, relying on tech-
nologies that the Federal Reserve has used for decades.
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We are on the cusp of a new monetary era. Facebook's announce-
ment in 2019 that it plans to launch a digital currency called Libra'
sent shockwaves through the rarefied world of central banking.2 Al-
though most central bankers greeted the emergence of Bitcoin and
other decentralized cryptocurrencies with relative equanimity,3 Libra
presented something much more formidable because it is backed by
the technical prowess, financial heft, and vast customer base of a lead-
ing technology giant. Even if Libra fails to take off, it is unlikely to be
1 LIBRA ASS'N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA 4 (2019).
2 See Kenneth Rogoff, The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-battle-for-dig-
ital-currency-supremacy-by-kenneth-rogoff-2019-11?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/
PC36-R6K8] ("If nothing else, Libra has inspired many advanced-economy central banks to ac-
celerate their programs to provide broader-based retail digital currencies .... ").
3 See Alastair Marsh, Why Central Bankers Got Serious About Digital Cash, BLOOMBERG




the end of the story.4 Today's tech companies have the scale and con-
sumer reach, not to mention the incentive, to create private digital
moneys that threaten to compete with or even displace the public
moneys that central banks issue and manage.
The result has been a rapidly growing official sector debate about
whether central banks should issue digital currencies of their own-
so-called central bank digital currencies ("CBDCs"). Leading econo-
mists have counseled that CBDCs are necessary to "ensure[] that
public money remains a relevant unit of account" in the face of "digi-
tal currencies associated with large platform ecosystems."5 In 2020,
the People's Bank of China began piloting a CBDC, the eCNY, in
several large cities-adding a further impetus to other central banks
to introduce their own products.6 The stakes are especially high for
the United States because a successful digital currency-whether con-
trolled by a private company or a foreign government-could imperil
the dollar's status as the dominant global currency, a source of "exor-
bitant privilege" for Americans.
Although this is one of the hottest topics in macroeconomics and
central banking today, the discussion has largely overlooked the most
straightforward and appealing strategy for implementing a U.S. dol-
lar-based CBDC: expanding access to the bank accounts the Federal
Reserve ("Fed") already offers to a small, favored set of clients. These
accounts consist of entries in a digital ledger-just like other digital
currencies8-and are extremely desirable, offering high interest, in-
4 Another proposed "global currency" called Saga has already launched. Martin Arnold,
Saga Launches Its Cryptocurrency as Libra Waits in the Wings, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), https:/
/www.ft.com/content/88133ee0-201b-1lea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b [https://perma.cc/E9XR-SQ7K].
5 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, The Digitalization of
Money 1 (Aug. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
6 Alun John, Explainer: How Does China's Digital Yuan Work?, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2020,
5:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-currency-digital-explainer/explainer-how-
does-chinas-digital-yuan-work-idUSKBN27411T [https://perma.cc/EV8W-NPJD] ("China on
Sunday concluded its largest pilot project to date for a central bank-backed digital yuan, with
analysts saying the trial extended its lead in the global race to develop a central bank digital
currency (CBDC).").
7 See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (2011) (explaining
that the dollar is at risk of losing its status in the global economy); see also Mu Changchun, Dir.,
People's Bank of China, Fireside Keynote: A Conversation with Mu Changchun, Director-Gen-
eral, People's Bank of China at the Central Bank of the Future: Building a Financial System for
a More Inclusive Economy Conference, at 3:37:05 (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=zgstsqa8vC0&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/LR8S-L8L6] ("[D]igital fiat currency
is born to be used for cross-border payments .... ").
8 See Agustin Carstens, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Lecture at Princeton
University: The Future of Money and the Payment System: What Role for Central Banks? (Dec.
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stant payments, and full government backing no matter how large the
account balance.9 U.S. law restricts these accounts to an exclusive cli-
entele consisting of banks and government entities.10 Privileged access
to these accounts creates a striking asymmetry at the core of our mon-
etary framework: government-issued physical currency is an open-ac-
cess resource, available to all, but government-issued igital currency
(in the form of central bank accounts) is not.
This dichotomy is unwarranted. Congress should authorize the
Fed to implement a broadly accessible, U.S. dollar-based CBDC by
giving the general public-individuals, businesses, and institutions-
the option to hold accounts at the central bank, which this Article
calls FedAccounts."1 FedAccounts would offer all the functionality of
5, 2019) ("Your bank balance is a digital currency in the sense that it is an electronic entry in a
ledger .... ").
9 See Maintenance of Reserve Balance Requirements, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS.
(Nov. 21. 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reserve-maintenance-manual-
maintenance-of-reserve-balance-requirements.htm [https://perma.cc/GPS8-4EQA]; What is the
FedNow Service?, FED. RSRV, https://www.frbservices.org/financial-services/fednow/what-is-
fednow.html [https://perma.cc/92YW-UJTC]; Amy Wolf, Why Federal Reserve Should Offer
Bank Accounts to Everyone, VAND. U. (June 20, 2018, 4:34 PM), https://news.vanderbilt.edu/
2018/06/20/federal-reserve-bank-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/6DYK-RVW5]. Central bank ac-
counts consist of base money, meaning they are fully sovereign and will not default no matter
how large the balance. By contrast, federal deposit insurance for ordinary bank accounts maxes
out at $250,000, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E), which presents a big problem for institutions with
large balances.
10 In addition to U.S. depository institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 342, the Fed is authorized to
maintain accounts for the United States Treasury, see id. § 391, certain government-sponsored
enterprises in the residential mortgage area, see id. §§ 1435, 1452(d), 1723a(g), foreign govern-
ments, banks, and central banks, id. §§ 347d, 358, certain international organizations, such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, see 22 U.S.C. § 286d, and designated finan-
cial market utilities, see 12 U.S.C. § 5465, as well as assorted other governmental and govern-
ment-sponsored entities that this Article omits here.
11 Since a draft of this Article was released in June 2018, the FedAccount proposal has
received extensive attention in the media as well as from congressional eaders, several of whom
have introduced legislation to implement the plan. See Matt Levine, Opinion, Maybe Dollars
Should Be Digital, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-06-11/maybe-dollars-should-be-digital [https://perma.cc/9E4M-6N6G] (discussing
the authors' FedAccount proposal); Dave Dayen, Give Everyone Government Bank Accounts,
NEw REPUBLIC (June 13, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148998/give-everyone-govern-
ment-bank-accounts [https://perma.cc/8B92-5D4D]; Why Americans Should Have Bank Ac-
counts at the Fed (Bloomberg TV June 14, 2018, 5:45 PM) (television interview with Morgan
Ricks, Professor of L. & Enter. Scholar, Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch.), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/videos/2018-06-14/why-americans-should-have-bank-accounts-at-the-fed-video [https://
perma.cc/4KCX-Q86H]; Matthew C. Klein, Banking with the Federal Reserve, BARRON'S (June
28, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/banking-with-the-federal-reserve-
1530198578 [https://perma.cc/A2XV-BPKC]; Jeff Spross, How to Make the Federal Reserve the
People's Bank, THE WEEK (July 9, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/783357/how-make-federal-
reserve-peoples-bank [https://perma.cc/N3YW-9R5Z]; Stacey Vanek Smith & Cardiff Garcia,
[Vol. 89:113
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ordinary bank accounts except for overdraft coverage. They would
also have all the special features that banks currently enjoy in their
central bank accounts, as well as some additional complementary fea-
tures. The FedAccount program would put government-issued igital
or "account" money on par with government-issued physical currency,
transforming digital dollars into a resource that anyone can use.
The FedAccount system would be far superior to the CBDC ap-
proaches that dominate current discussions. Most proposals portray
CBDC as a sort of disembodied physical currency-a digital "token"
Fed Accounts for All!, NPR PLANET MONEY: THE INDICATOR (July 11, 2018, 5:23 PM) (podcast
interview with Morgan Ricks, Professor of L. & Enter. Scholar, Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch.), https://
www.npr.org/sections/money/2018/07/11/628173553/fed-accounts-for-all [https://perma.cc/X6SM-
RLF4]; Try This: What To Do If the Usual Weapons Fail, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2018), https://
www.economist.com/special-report/2018/10/11/what-to-do-if-the-usual-weapons-fail [https://
perma.cc/6CF6-6UQE]; Matthew Yglesias, Bernie Sanders and AOC's Plan to Crack Down on
High-Interest Loans, Explained, Vox (May 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/5/16/18624041/credit-card-rate-payday-loan-stop-loan-sharks-sanders-ocasio-cortez
[https://perma.cc/LLB5-TALW]; Dave Dayen, Building the People's Banks, AM. PROSPECT (Jan.
16 2020), https://prospect.org/economy/building-the-people%E2%80%99s-banks/ [https://
perma.cc/MCV8-68AC]; Mike Orcutt, We Just Glimpsed How a "Digital Dollar" Might Work,
MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/26/950277/we-just-
glimpsed-how-a-digital-dollar-might-work-thanks-to-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/XH8L-
HKHE]; Jason Brett, How A U.S. Senator's Digital Dollar Plan Offers Mark Zuckerberg His
Crypto Comeuppance, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2020, 9:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jason-
brett/2020/03/27/how-a-us-senators-digital-dollar-plan-offers-mark-zuckerberg-his-crypto-come-
uppance/?sh=755262e5306d [https://perma.cc/9Z7V-2HGH] ("In [Senator Sherrod Brown's]
plan, everyone would be allowed to set up a digital dollar wallet that would be called a 'FedAc-
count'.... ); Editorial, Stop Dawdling. People Need Money., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/opinion/coronavirus-stimulus-check-payment.html [https://
perma.cc/EFZ7-8FPD] ("The government could improve [distribution of relief payments] signif-
icantly by establishing a bank account for every American at the Federal Reserve."); Emily
Flitter & Emily Cochrane, As Banks Stumble in Delivering Aid, Congress Weighs Other Options,
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/11/business/coronavirus-aid-
banks.html [https://perma.cc/Y5ZV-QRLV] ("Some Democrats on the Senate Banking Commit-
tee want to see the Fed create accounts for every American."); Annie Linskey, Biden's Flexibility
on Policy Could Mean Fierce Fights If He Wins, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bidens-flexibility-on-policy-could-mean-bloody-fights-if-he-
wins/2020/09/06/b8d66c3c-e622-11ea-bc79-834454439a44_story.html [https://perma.cc/YB83-
9HKK] (noting that "[w]hen Joe Biden released economic recommendations two months ago,"
his team included the idea of "having the Federal Reserve guarantee all Americans a bank ac-
count"); Banking for All Act, S. 3571, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020) (as introduced by Sen. Sherrod
Brown) (establishing "FedAccounts"); Financial Protections and Assistance for America's Con-
sumers, States, Businesses, and Vulnerable Populations Act, H.R. 6321, 116th Cong. § 101 (2020)
(as introduced by Rep. Maxine Waters) (establishing "FedAccounts"); Take Responsibility for
Workers and Families Act, H.R. 6379, 116th Cong. § 101 (2020) (as originally drafted), https://
www.sasse.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1038e060-Obbf-4d5e-9bc8-980c6ba0bl9c/pelosi-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C33-PGCK] (establishing "FedAccounts"); Automatic Boost to Communities
Act, H.R. 6553, 116th Cong. § 3 (introduced by Rep. Rashida Tlaib) (establishing
"FedAccounts").
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that retains physical currency's properties of anonymity and direct
peer-to-peer transfer.12 These proposals typically envision a closed
system of digital "wallets" that is segregated from the existing system
of money and payments and based on distributed ledger technology,
like the blockchain technology that undergirds Bitcoin and (prospec-
tively) Libra.13 These design features are questionable. The Fed and
other central banks should not be eager to facilitate fully anonymous
transfers, which can be used for terrorist financing, money laundering,
tax evasion, and other illicit activities.'4 Nor is it apparent why central
banks should wish to create a segregated, closed system that is walled
off from the mainstream payment system. When it comes to money
and payments, integration and interoperability beat fragmentation
and balkanization.5 And distributed ledger technology, however inge-
nious its conception, remains extremely slow and inefficient compared
with centralized ledger systems.16 For central banks, these cryptocur-
rency design features are a needless distraction.7 The FedAccount
system would be seamlessly interoperable with the existing system of
money and payments and would rely on low-cost, reliable systems and
technologies that the Fed has used successfully for decades.18
The FedAccount program would also bring genuinely transforma-
tional change to the monetary-financial system, in ways both obvious
and unexpected. Importantly, it would foster financial inclusion. The
mainstream U.S. payment system currently fails millions of "un-
banked" and "underbanked" households.19 FedAccounts, properly
12 See COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 6 (2018).
13 See, e.g., Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Itai Agur, Anil Ari,
John Kiff, Adina Popescu & Celine Rochon, Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency, at
6, 29, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/18/08 (2018) (describing a CBDC design involving
"preloading tokens onto a wallet"); Benoit Cour6, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank,
The Future of Central Bank Money (May 14, 2018) ("[C]entral banks today could make use of
new technologies that would enable the introduction of what is widely referred to as a 'token-
based' currency-one based on a distributed ledger technology (DLT) or comparable crypto-
graphic technology.").
14 Alma Angotti & Anne Marie Minogue, Risks and Rewards: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency
and Vulnerability to Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Tax Evasion, WESTLAw J.
BANK & LENDER LIAB., Nov. 26, 2018, at 3; see also infra Section IV.B.
15 See infra Sections II.B & IIIB.
16 Id.
17 Cf Aleksander Berentsen & Fabian Schar, The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money
and the Non-case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, 100 FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. Louis REV.
97, 103-04 (2018) (stating that central banks should not use cryptocurrencies because there is no
advantage and anonymity creates significant risks).
18 See, e.g., infra Part I, Section IIE.
19 See infra Section IIA.
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structured, would be a money-and-payments safety net for such
households, lessening their reliance on expensive and subpar
alternatives.
FedAccounts would also hold appeal at the other end of the in-
come and wealth spectrum. The interest rate paid on central bank ac-
counts (known as the interest-on-reserves or IOR rate) would be
attractive to large businesses and other institutions. Equally appealing
to large institutions would be the sovereign and nondefaultable status
of these balances. FedAccounts would be pure base money, an asset
not realistically available elsewhere in "account" form. Further, free
instant payments between FedAccount holders would create network
effects: the system's value to existing users would rise as more users
joined. For these reasons, the uptake would likely be robust.
If adopted on a large scale, FedAccounts would bring about less
obvious, but no less profound, systemic changes. Financial stability
would be dramatically enhanced: FedAccounts would likely crowd out
privately issued deposit substitutes, which are a major source of finan-
cial instability. Monetary control and monetary policy transmission
would improve; current problems with "pass through" of policy rates
would diminish or disappear. Also, because the Fed would not charge
interchange fees on debit card transactions, FedAccounts would re-
duce or eliminate an implicit tax on retailers and consumers. Moreo-
ver, the system could usher in desirable regulatory simplification. Far
from being fiscally expensive, FedAccounts could generate revenue for
the federal government-possibly a lot of it-all while imposing mini-
mal or potentially zero user fees.2
This Article considers the effects the FedAccount program (or
just "FedAccount") would have on the central bank, the banking sys-
tem, and financial "intermediation" more generally, and finds the ef-
fects salutary. This Article also compares FedAccount to the CBDC
plans currently under discussion and to other loosely related reform
proposals: full-reserve banking and postal banking. FedAccount com-
pares favorably. Finally, this Article anticipates objections on various
grounds, including institutional competence; law enforcement and
counterterrorism; cybersecurity and fraud prevention; privacy and
civil liberties; the availability of supposedly better alternatives, such as
regulatory mandates or Fintech payment solutions not involving direct
government provisioning; possible effects on lending, small banks, and
financial innovation; the loss of purported synergies between deposits
20 See infra Section ILG.
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and lending; and possible political obstacles to adoption. This Article
addresses these objections and explains why they do not undermine
the case for FedAccount.
This Article's analysis relates to and builds upon others' work in
money and banking. Mehrsa Baradaran's work on postal banking has
influenced this Article considerably.21 James Tobin's two-page "depos-
ited currency" proposal from 1987 is a precursor to this Article's argu-
ment.2 2 Former U.K. central banker Sir Paul Tucker has offered a
more critical take on "[u]niversal access to accounts at the central
bank."23 His main objections relate to predicted effects on credit allo-
cation and innovation,24 issues that this Article addresses.25 The idea
of public access to central bank accounts has begun to percolate into
public discourse.26 Existing treatments are incomplete; this Article
aims to concretize the proposal and trace its implications with greater
precision.
At the level of theory, FedAccount reconceptualizes the roles of
public and private actors in our monetary framework. This split has
21 See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOw THE OTHER HALF BANKS 9 (2015) (propos-
ing "a central bank for the poor"); Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1330-36 (2014) (comparing problems with the current banking system
to weak consumer protection and poor services for marginalized communities).
22 James Tobin, The Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, in RESTRUCTURING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS
CITY, 167, 172 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Kan. City 1987) ("I think the government should make avail-
able to the public a medium with the convenience of deposits and the safety of currency, essen-
tially currency on deposit, transferable in any amount by check or other order.... The Federal
Reserve banks themselves could offer such deposits .... "). For more recent but similarly brief
treatments, see Dirk Niepelt, Reserves for Everyone-Towards a New Monetary Regime?, Vox
EU (Jan. 21, 2015), https://voxeu.org/article/keep-cash-let-public-hold-central-bank-reserves
[https://perma.cc/3DRS-LF85] ("'Reserves for everyone' deserves serious consideration."); NICK
GRUEN, CENTRAL BANKING FOR ALL: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR RADICAL CHANGE 7 (2014)
(advocating the extension of "some core central banking services to individuals and businesses");
and Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 101 (advocating for electronic central bank accounts).
23 SIR PAUL TUCKER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 9-10 (2017). For another skeptical take, see Cceur6, supra note 13 ("From today's perspec-
tive, there are no clear benefits from allowing the general public to hold digital central bank
reserves .... ").
24 TUCKER, supra note 23, at 9-10.
25 See infra Sections IILA, IV.G.
26 See, e.g., Central Banks Should Consider Offering Accounts to Everyone, ECONOMIST
(May 26, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/central-banks-
should-consider-offering-accounts-to-everyone [https://perma.cc/LP8G-FYHK]. Some of the re-
cent interest stems from a June 10, 2018, Swiss referendum to ban fractional-reserve banking, a
very different proposal from the public option advanced in this Article. See Ralph Atkins, Swiss




always been the central issue of financial regulatory history and policy
in the United States. And from the National Bank Act of 186427 to the
Federal Reserve Act of 191328 and the Banking Acts of 193329 and
1935,30 the trajectory has generally been to make the dollar money
supply more and more public. This public conception reached its
zenith with the New Deal system of bank regulation, the basic thrust
of which was to bring private money creation within the public fold.
Bank-issued money became a sovereign obligation through the mech-
anism of deposit insurance.31 Banks-money augmentation firms-
were required to inhabit a special institutional environment, segre-
gated from the rest of the financial system.32 Bank chartering was re-
strictive and discretionary.33 And although one can quibble with the
details, this system was on the whole very successful: it brought an
unprecedented level of financial and macroeconomic stability.34
But the New Deal system began to erode in the 1970s, and the
erosion accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s. Policymakers allowed a
vast array of deposit substitutes-private moneys, denominated in
dollars-to proliferate on a huge scale.35 In other words, the dollar
money supply became increasingly privatized. And with this privatiza-
tion, instability returned, culminating in the disaster of 2008 and the
Great Recession. FedAccount is therefore also an entry in a long-run-
ning debate. It aims to push money creation back in a more public
direction. The importance of these issues for our economy and indeed
for our democracy would be hard to overstate. Monetary dysfunction
has played a persistent and crucial role in U.S. history, from colonial
times through today,36 and modern financial regulation has not solved
the problem.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the FedAc-
count proposal. Part II discusses its benefits. Part III explores the pro-
posal's structural implications for banking and central banking,
27 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (superseding the National Bank Act of
1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665).
28 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522.
29 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.
30 Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684.
31 § 8, 48 Stat. at 168.
32 Id. §§ 16, 21.
33 § 101, 49 Stat. at 687.
34 David M. Kennedy, What the New Deal Did, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 251, 255 (2009).
35 See infra Section I.C.
36 See Money in Colonial Times, FED. RSRV. BANK OF PHILA., https://
www.philadelphiafed.org/education/teachers/resources/money-in-colonial-times [https://
perma.cc/9WCU-X6LV] (describing the United States' early monetary problems).
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examines the shortcomings of other CBDC designs, and compares
FedAccount with narrow banking and postal banking proposals. Fi-
nally, Part IV addresses costs and objections.
I. FEDACCOUNTS
All U.S. citizens, residents, and omestically domiciled businesses
and institutions would be eligible for FedAccounts.37 Like the account
balances that banks keep at the Fed, FedAccount balances would be
CBDC: dollar balances issued by the central bank and maintained as
digital ledger entries. FedAccounts would offer all the functionality of
ordinary bank transaction accounts, except for overdraft coverage.
They would come with debit cards for point-of-sale payments and
ATM access. They would support direct deposit and online bill pay.
Account holders could access their accounts on the internet or
through a mobile phone application. Monthly statements would be
supplied by email (preferably) or in hard copy. There would be a cus-
tomer service number. Although checks are on their way to extinc-
tion,38 the Fed might also offer checkbooks for a small fee.
There would be some key differences between FedAccounts and
standard bank accounts:
1. No fees or minimum balances. FedAccount fees would be
minimal or zero. There would be no minimum balances
or other policies that exclude the currently unbanked.
Applicants would not be screened based on credit scores
or similar metrics. No one would be denied an account
based on profitability considerations.
2. Interest on balances. FedAccounts would pay the same
IOR rate that commercial banks receive on their bal-
ances. Since late 2008, when the Fed started paying IOR,
this rate has been pegged at or just shy of the top end of
the federal funds target range.39 This Article discusses
IOR in Section II.D.
3. Real-time payments. Payments between FedAccounts
would clear in real time, just like interbank payments
processed by the Fed.40 A user-friendly web and
37 Like existing bank accounts, FedAccounts would comply with anti-money laundering
and Bank Secrecy Act requirements. See infra Section IV.B.
38 David Marino-Nachison, Payments: The Next Step Toward the Extinction of Checks and
Cash, BARRON'S (May 11, 2018, 10:25 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/payments-the-
next-step-toward-the-extinction-of-checks-and-cash-1526048738 [https://perma.cc/PEC2-CB58].
39 Robert Heller, Will Paying Interest on Reserves Endanger the Fed's Independence?, 39
CATO J. 597, 597, 599 (2019).
40 See What is the FedNow Service?, supra note 9.
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smartphone interface would support free and instant
peer-to-peer payments between FedAccount holders.
The system would work like existing popular peer-to-
peer payment services (e.g., Venmo, Square Cash) ex-
cept that users would never need to "cash out" their bal-
ances to a bank account:41 FedAccount is a bank
account.
4. No interchange fees. To the fullest extent possible, the
central bank would decline to receive interchange fees in
connection with debit card payments. This would reduce
or eliminate an implicit tax on retailers and consumers.
This Article discusses interchange in Section II.E.
5. Pure money. FedAccount balances would be fully sover-
eign base money, just like reserve balances that commer-
cial banks hold. There would be no possibility of default
on balances of any size. Deposit insurance would be
superfluous.
FedAccount would not be a lending program. The Fed would not
provide credit directly to individuals or businesses. If widely adopted,
however, FedAccount would likely enlarge the Fed's balance sheet,
raising questions about how the Fed allocates its investment portfolio.
This Article delves into these structural issues in Part III. For now, it is
enough to note that FedAccount would not involve the Fed in ex-
tending credit to individuals or nonbank businesses, nor would it nec-
essarily affect the aggregate supply, or cost of credit or
"intermediation."
Nor would FedAccount require the Fed to establish brick-and-
mortar branches. It was not so long ago that practically all payments
involved physical payment media-cash and checks-and ubiquitous
retail bank locations were central to the payment system's function-
ing. Check clearing in particular was a huge logistical undertaking.42
Restricting access to central bank accounts was perhaps understanda-
ble under these conditions.
Times have changed. Modern telecommunications and informa-
tion technology-including the internet, mobile communication net-
works, payment card terminals, and smartphones-have made
physical payment media decreasingly relevant to everyday transac-
41 See Melanie Weir, How to Cash Out on Cash App and Transfer Money to Your Bank
Account Instantly, Bus. INSIDER, (Dec. 31, 2019, 11:24 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
how-to-cash-out-on-cash-app [https://perma.cc/7GRH-PANF].
42 See, e.g., MARY BETH MATTHEWS & STEVE H. NICKLES, PAYMENTS LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL 142-44 (2d ed. 2015).
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tions. Electronic payments now predominate.43 Such payments consist
of electronic ledger entries that do not require physical delivery of
payment media at any level of the system. Checks are in severe de-
cline. As recently as 2000, check payments outnumbered debit card,
credit card, and Automated Clearing House ("ACH") payments com-
bined.44 Checks were still the predominant noncash payment method
in 2007.45 But by 2015, card-based and ACH payments dwarfed check
payments by a factor of almost seven.46 And checks can now be "de-
posited" by remote deposit capture, including by smartphone.
To be sure, physical payment media have not (yet) been entirely
supplanted. Not everyone wants or is able to use remote deposit cap-
ture for checks, and cash remains important for many Americans.47
However, the FedAccount system would have multiple possible ways
of addressing this problem. First, the Fed could enlist the physical
plant and personnel of the U.S. Postal Service. Fed ATMs installed at
post office locations, and possibly also trained postal clerks, could
handle cash deposits and withdrawals as well as check deposits (in lieu
of image capture) for FedAccount holders. This would require signifi-
cant investment, but handling and transporting cash and checks are
squarely in the Fed's wheelhouse.48 Second, the Fed could engage
third-party banks, credit unions, or ATM networks as the Fed's agents
to accept cash and check deposits from FedAccount holders. Third,
the Fed could engage nonbank retail stores to serve this agency func-
tion for un- and underbanked populations. Retail stores already make
43 See Geoffrey R. Gerdes, Recent Payment Trends in the United States, FED. RSRV. BULL.,
Oct. 2008, at A75, A75 (noting that "electronic payments . . . exceeded the number of check
payments for the first time" in 2003).
44 See FED. RSRV Sys., FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 2016, at 4 (2016). Accompa-
nying data tables are available on the Fed's website. See The Federal Reserve Payments Study
2016 - Accessible Version, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Feb. 28, 2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/2016-payment-study-accessible.htm#figure2 [https://
perma.cc/M8PD-GELF]. ACH payments include direct deposits and recurring bill payments.






45 See FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 44, at 4.
46 See id.
47 See KRISTA TEDDER & RACHEL HUBER, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RSCH., 2020 HEALTH
OF CASH STUDY 4-5 (2020); CARDTRONICS, HEALTH OF CASH CHECK-UP 3 (2020).
48 See FedCash Services, FED. RSRV., https://www.frbservices.org/financial-services/cash/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/B5RZ-4VQU] (describing the Fed's "FedCash" services).
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prepaid cards available for sale.49 These three options are not mutu-
ally exclusive, and this list is not exhaustive.
Residual physical payment media are not a major obstacle to
FedAccount. In fact, for reasons that will become clear in Part II,
FedAccount would accelerate their decline. Although phasing out
cash and checks is not necessarily an objective of FedAccount, the
program would push in this direction.50
II. BENEFITS
It is remarkable how many seemingly disparate problems FedAc-
count would mitigate or outright solve. The benefits would span an
astonishing range of areas and would include a much more inclusive
financial system, better consumer protection, faster and more efficient
payments, greater financial and macroeconomic stability, improved
monetary policy transmission, reduced payment tolls (interchange
fees), streamlined regulation and regulatory structures, and increased
fiscal revenue arising from recapture of economic rents from the fi-
nancial sector. This Part discusses each benefit in depth.
A. Financial Inclusion and Consumer Protection
Many Americans lack access to basic banking services. Whereas
bank account penetration in other advanced economies like Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom exceeds 97%,51
about "6.5 percent of U.S. households [are] 'unbanked,' meaning that
no one in the household had a [bank] account."52 Another 18.7% of
U.S. households are "underbanked," meaning that, despite having a
bank account, they rely to some degree on expensive nonbank ser-
49 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT'L CREDIT
UNION ADMIN., OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NET-
WORK, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE TO ISSUING BANKS ON APPLYING CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS TO HOLDERS OF PREPAID CARDS 2 (2016).
50 See generally KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH: HOw LARGE-DENOMINATION
BILLS AID CRIME AND TAx EVASION AND CONSTRAIN MONETARY POLICY (2016) (advancing a
case for phasing out cash).
51 Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer & Peter Van Oudheusden, World
Bank Grp., The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World
83-84 (World Bank Pol'y Rsch, Working Paper No. 7255, 2014).
52 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UN-
DERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2017) ("Approximately 8.4 million U.S. households, made up of
14.1 million adults and 6.4 million children, were unbanked in 2017.").
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vices-such as nonbank money orders, check cashing, and payday
loans-for payments and other financial needs.53
Un- and underbanked individuals use a mishmash of products
and services to make and receive payments. They cash checks at retail
stores (such as grocery, drug, or convenience stores) and standalone
check-cashing businesses. These providers typically charge 1.5% to
3.5% of face value.54 They stand in line at bill pay centers to pay rou-
tine expenses in cash, and they use nonbank money orders, which are
subject to fees.55 They transfer money within the United States
through expensive wire transfer outlets like Western Union or
Moneygram.56 And increasingly they turn to prepaid debit cards.57
These cards have various types of fees, including upfront fees,
monthly fees, transaction fees, cash reload fees, ATM fees, account
statement fees, customer service call fees, and online bill pay fees.58 In
spite of all these fees, prepaid cards can experience service interrup-
tions, leaving users unable to access funds for days at a time.59
53 See id. ("Approximately 24.2 million U.S. households, composed of 48.9 million adults
and 15.4 million children, were underbanked in 2017.").
54 See Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking Among
Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS,
CREDIT AND BANKING AMONG Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1, 3 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael
S. Barr eds., 2009). Underbanked households, which are predominately low- or moderate-in-
come, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009), may resort to nonbank check cashing for reasons of convenience and
immediacy of payment. See RACHEL SCHNEIDER & BALAFAMA LONGJOHN, CTR. FIN. SERVS.
INNOVATION, BEYOND CHECK-CASHING: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND AND BUSI-
NESS INNOVATION FOR IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO CHECK FUNDS 12 (2014).
55 See Christine Bradley, Susan Burhouse, Heather Gratton & Rae-Ann Miller, Alterna-
tive Financial Services: A Primer, 3 FDIC Q., no.1, 2009, at 39, 39-40.
56 See Carol M. Kopp, MoneyGram vs. Western Union: What's the Difference?, INVES-
TOPEDIA (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/081715/sending-
money-moneygram-vs-western-union.asp [https://perma.cc/MLP9-E7HW].
57 Bradley et al., supra note 55, at 42.
58 See, e.g., Plan Fees, RUSHCARD, https://apply.rushcard.com/start?audience=Directmar-
keting#legal-fees [https://perma.cc/84H3-5SXG]; see also Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg.
83,934, 83,937, 83,954 (Nov. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1005, 1026) (describing
fees).
59 See Stacy Cowley, Senators Press for Answers After Prepaid Debit Cards Fail, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/business/dealbook/senators-press-
for-answers-after-prepaid-debit-cards-fail.html [https://perma.cc/UGQ7-TVSH]; Liz Moyer &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Rush Card Breakdown Affects Thousands of Prepaid Debit Card Users,




The unbanked also save at a much lower rate,60 in part because
they do not have checking and savings accounts.61 Low savings in-
creases the likelihood that these households will need to use expen-
sive nonbank credit products, such as payday loans, to cover cash
shortfalls and emergency expenses. Such products can trap households
in cycles of debt.62 Between interest and fees on short-term credit
products and haircuts on earned income, the unbanked bear tens of
billions of dollars in annual costs for financial services that wealthier
households either get for free or do no need at all.63
Traditional private bank accounts are not currently meeting these
households' needs. Bank branch locations are less prevalent in low-
income communities and their hours of operation are inconvenient for
many prospective users.64 Minimum balance requirements, account
fees, and delays in check clearing deter low- and moderate-income
households from opening or retaining accounts.65 Bank of America
recently announced that it would begin imposing a twelve-dollar
monthly maintenance fee on all accounts not meeting certain criteria,
including minimum balance criteria.66 Cultural and sociological factors
also come into play. For example, the second most cited reason for
lacking a bank account is "don't trust banks."67
Banks find it unprofitable to service low-balance accounts.68
Moreover, when banks do maintain such accounts, they often use
60 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 52, at 8 (reporting that a rate of 17% of unbanked
households saved compared with 56% of underbanked households and 62% of fully banked
households).
61 See BARADARAN, supra note 21, at 213 (noting that countries where individuals have
better access to bank accounts have substantially higher savings rates).
62 See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N.
GORDON, COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 263
(2016) (estimating that 75% of payday loans are advanced to "borrowers taking out upwards of
eleven payday loans per year").
63 See BARADARAN, supra note 21, at 212 (noting that unbanked households spend $89
billion per year on fees for financial services).
64 Donald P. Morgan, How Do Bank Branch Closures Affect Low-Income Communities?,
WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/how-do-bank-
branch-closures-affect-low-income-communities [https://perma.cc/QJ88-BBDT].
65 Vassilisa Rubstova, Banking and Poverty: Why the Poor Turn to Alternative Financial
Services, BERKELEY ECON. R. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://econreview.berkeley.edu/banking-and-
poverty-why-the-poor-turn-to-alternative-financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/9VXS-JZFG].
66 Rachel Louise Ensign, Bank of America: No More Free Checking for Customers with
Low Balances, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2018, 1:40 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankof
america-no-more-free-checking-for-customers-with-low-balances-1516625715 [https://perma.cc/
SQT2-9VBA].
67 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 52, at 23.
68 Aaron Klein, America's Poor Subsidize Wealthier Consumers in a Vicious Income Ine-
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questionable tactics to generate revenue, such as overdraft "protec-
tion" fees averaging thirty-five dollars per overdraft.69 These fees ex-
ploit behavioral biases (among other things, many people "who incur
overdraft fees do not expect to overdraw their accounts") and fall dis-
proportionately on low-balance households.70 In 2013, one in ten
Americans reported paying such fees.7 1 Estimates of annual overdraft
fees vary, ranging from $14 billion to as much as $32 billion.7 2 Despite
federal consumer protection regulation directed at overdraft abuses,7 3
banks have been very successful at convincing vulnerable consumers
to "opt in" to these fees by using aggressive and sometimes misleading
marketing practices.74 According to a recent survey, half of people
who paid an overdraft fee in 2013 did not remember ever opting in.75
And a history of overdrafts may preclude access to a bank account in
the first place: banks use the private ChexSystems to screen out users
who have had problems with checking accounts in the past.76
This Article does not fault for-profit institutions for pursuing
profits (although abusively exploiting behavioral biases should be off-
limits). But this Article does question whether this resource-the
mainstream, account-based money-and-payments ystem-should be
left to "market" provisioning in the first place. Money is often de-
scribed as a public good,7 7 and FedAccount would bring this concep-
quality Cycle, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/americas-
poor-subsidize-wealthier-consumers-in-a-vicious-income-inequality-cycle/ [https://perma.cc/
2LS5-CE43] ("It can cost banks between $250 and $400 to establish a new checking account and
another several hundred dollars a year to maintain it.").
69 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., OVERDRAWN: PERSISTENT CONFUSION AND CONCERN
ABOUT BANK OVERDRAFT PRACTICES 1 (2014).
70 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1177 (2013).
71 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 69, at 1.
72 See Klein, supra note 68 (estimating $14 billion in overdraft fees per year); LISA
SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 31 (2017)
(estimating $32 billion in overdraft fees in 2014); THERESA SCHMALL & EVA WOLKOWITZ, CTR.
FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, 2016 FINANCIALLY UNDERSERVED MARKET SIZE STUDY 12 (2016)
(estimating $24 billion in overdraft fees in 2015).
73 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2020).
74 See Willis, supra note 70, at 1181-99.
75 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 69, at 5.
76 See James Marvin Perez, Blacklisted: The Unwarranted Divestment of Access to Bank
Accounts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1586, 1587-88 (2005).
77 E.g., SUBCOMM. ON ECON. IN GOV'T OF THE J. ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., THE ANALY-
SIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM 48 (Comm. Print 1969)
("The creation of money is in many respects an example of a public good."); CHARLES P. KIN-
DLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES 19 (6th ed. 2011) ("Money is
a public good . . . ."); DAVID LAIDLER, TAKING MONEY SERIOUSLY AND OTHER ESSAYS 47
(1990) ("[T]here is something of the nature of a public good about money .... "); James M.
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tion to full realization by transforming the U.S. account-money system
into public infrastructure akin to roads, sidewalks, public libraries, the
judicial system, and law enforcement. These resources are usually
funded in whole or in part out of general revenue, with low or no user
fees. FedAccount would not have any fees or minimum balance re-
quirements and would be marketed explicitly as a public service, open
to all.
FedAccount would attract millions of people who currently
choose not to or are unable to maintain bank accounts, dramatically
reducing the number of un- and underbanked households.78 These
households would benefit enormously. Their payment-related costs
would plummet, leaving them with more resources to meet other
needs. FedAccount would not exploit behavioral biases. Overdrafts
would be disallowed. (Those who truly value overdrafts could stick
with existing bank accounts, though this Article argues that virtually
all consumers would be better off using other credit products.) And
consumers' need for alternative credit suppliers would decrease-
both because their savings would likely increase and because they
would be more likely to qualify for credit cards and other forms of
bank credit, which are (at least somewhat) cheaper and safer.
But the benefits of inclusion would extend beyond these house-
holds themselves. People and businesses on the other side of payments
are better off transacting with fully banked individuals. Employers
benefit from using direct deposit instead of cutting physical checks.
Many businesses benefit from customers' use of convenient and relia-
ble automatic bill pay. Government agencies benefit from easier ad-
Buchanan, The Constitutionalization of Money, 30 CATO J. 251, 251 (2010) ("The market will not
work effectively with monetary anarchy."); Carstens, supra note 8, at 2 (describing the trust in
the currency underpinned by the central bank as a public good "[l]ike the legal system"), John
Cochrane, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: Ending Too Big to Fail Sym-
posium 2:07:30-:40 (May 16, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcidqjmxPyk [https://
perma.cc/5DPX-2E9Q] ("There's a few things that government has a natural monopoly
in ... national defense, courts, property rights, and I think money is one of them."). Even Milton
Friedman-a champion of laissez faire in other areas-called the provision of a stable monetary
framework "an essential governmental function on a par with the provision of a stable legal
framework." MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 8 (1959). For a con-
trary, laissez-faire perspective, see LAWRENCE H. WHITE, THE THEORY OF MONETARY INSTITU-
TIONS 88-119 (1999).
78 One impediment to bank account access in the United States is the Treasury's strict
customer identification requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a) (2019). FedAccounts on their
own would not directly aid people who do not have the official documents needed to verify their
identity. To address this problem, the Fed should implement a tiered "know your customer"
("KYC") program allowing residents without the necessary government photo ID to open basic,
small-dollar accounts, akin to the system in place for prepaid debit cards.
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ministration of benefit transfers and tax refunds.79 These network
externalities from FedAccount would be large. Also, FedAccount
would ease the oversight burden on state and federal consumer agen-
cies and bank regulators because overdraft abuses and other bank-
account-related consumer protection issues would decline, as would
usage of substandard credit products. Finally, FedAccount would fos-
ter social cohesion and reduce marginalization. The value of this bene-
fit is incalculable.
B. Payment Speed and Efficiency
FedAccount would greatly reduce payment system frictions. Al-
though the Fed uses real-time gross settlement ("RTGS") for in-
terbank transfers, retail payment networks in the United States are far
slower.80 Checks still take up to two days to clear.81 Even wire trans-
fers do not settle until the end of the day, and credit card payments
may not settle for up to two days.82 By comparison, Japan has had
real-time payments since 1973 and many other countries, including
South Africa, Singapore, India, and the United Kingdom, have transi-
tioned to real-time retail payments in recent years.83 Payment delays
are costly for the economy as a whole and are especially so for house-
holds living paycheck to paycheck.84
In an effort to speed up U.S. retail payments, the Fed in 2015
convened the Faster Payments Task Force, a 300-plus member group
consisting of financial institutions, consumer groups, and other inter-
ested parties, with the ambitious goal of achieving universal real-time
79 For example, the United States Treasury makes over one billion payments per year
valued at over $3 trillion. IPP, ELECTRONIC INVOICING: WHY IT MATTERS (2014) (highlighting
remarks from John Hill, Ass't Comm'r for Payment Mgmt., U.S. Treasury Bureau of Fiscal Srvs.,
2014 IPP Agency Forum (March 6, 2014)). Each payment once cost Treasury $1, but because of
increasing electronification they now cost a fraction of that. See id.
80 FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE U.S. PATH TO FASTER PAYMENTS: FINAL RE-
PORT PART ONE: THE FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE APPROACH 52 (2017). RTGS systems
permit banks to "instantaneous[ly] transfer ... money and/or securities." Greg Daugherty, Real-
Time Gross Settlement (R TGS), INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/rtgs.asp#:~:text=the %20term%20real%2Dtime %20gross,books%20of%20a %20central
%20bank [https://perma.cc/4GF3-J4K2].
81 See id. at 54.
82 See id. at 52-53.
83 See id. at 30.
84 See FED. RSRV. SYS., STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM 38-39
(2015); Aaron Klein, How the Fed Can Help Families Living Paycheck to Paycheck, BROOKINGS




payments in the United States by 2020.85 The Task Force issued a final
report in 2017,86 and then disbanded amidst a lack of consensus among
its members. Although The Clearing House, a consortium of large
banks,87 launched a real-time payments service in 2017,88 its reach has
been modest so far; banks' incentives to improve settlement time are
mixed because faster payments would cut into their fee revenue.89 Ad-
ditionally, small banks have been leery of tying themselves to a system
run by the largest banks.90 Promisingly, the Fed in 2019 proposed a
new RTGS service called FedNow to facilitate real-time, around-the-
clock retail payments through banks of any size.91 But the service is
not expected to be up and running until 2023 or 2024, prompting criti-
cism that the service should be called not FedNow but "Fed Five
Years From Now." 92 Moreover, large banks remain resistant despite
small banks, retailers, and technology companies applauding the
move.93
FedAccount payments would clear instantly for in-network users,
solving at least part of the payments problem in one fell swoop. Any
payment from one FedAccount to another would clear in real time,
just like interbank payments have for decades.94 For example, the U.S.
85 See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, https://fasterpaymentstaskforce.org/ [https://
perma.cc/SYF4-R8YZ].
86 FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 80.
87 Our History, THE CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/history
[https://perma.cc/YU2Z-5GG2].
88 The RTP Network: For All Financial Institutions, CLEARING HOUSE, https://
www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/rtp/institution [https://perma.cc/5Q6E-HH9T].
89 Klein, supra note 84.
90 See Kevin Wack & Hannah Lang, Fed Plans to Launch Real-Time Payment Service by
2024, AM. BANKER (Aug. 5, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fed-plans-
to-launch-real-time-payment-service-by-2024 [https://perma.cc/EU62-BLTJ] ("[M]any small
banks and credit unions, wary that their interests will not be taken into account, have declined so
far to sign up for the big-bank-owned system.").
91 See Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Delivering Faster
Payments for All, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Town Hall (Aug. 5,
2019); FedNow Service, FED. RSRV., https://www.frbservices.org/financial-services/fednow/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/LLV9-767E].
92 Kevin Wack, And Now, the Hard Part of the Fed's Path to Real-Time Payments, AM.
BANKER, (Aug. 5, 2019, 8:43 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/and-now-the-hard-
part-of-the-feds-path-to-real-time-payments [https://perma.cc/37RM-ZS5G].
93 See Victoria Guida, Big Banks Prepare to Battle the Fed on Faster Payments, POLITICO
(July 19, 2019, 6:08 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/19/big-banks-prepare-battle-fed-
faster-payments-1605935 [https://perma.cc/X952-DTAG].
94 The Fed adopted RTGS in the early 1970s when Fedwire "migrated to a fully computer-
ized platform." MORTEN L. BECH & BART HOBIJN, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. 260,
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION WITHIN CENTRAL BANKING: THE CASE OF REAL-TIME GROSS SET-
TLEMENT 4 (2006).
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federal government, which already has an account at the Fed,95 could
make payments-including government salaries and social security
checks-by instantly crediting millions of FedAccounts rather than
channeling payments through multiple institutions each month.96
Real-time in-network payments would be a major inducement for in-
dividuals and businesses to join FedAccount.
There are thousands of banks, credit unions, and money services
businesses in the United States.97 This degree of payment system frag-
mentation-involving thousands of separate ledgers stitched together
through various correspondent and clearing arrangements-creates
inefficiencies. Network-type resources work better when they are
highly integrated; fragmentation raises frictions and limits economies
of scale. By bringing more transactions directly onto the Fed's central
ledger, FedAccount would reduce transaction costs and generate posi-
tive spillovers throughout the economy.
C. Financial and Macroeconomic Stability
FedAccount would bolster financial and macroeconomic stabil-
ity-perhaps dramatically. It is no exaggeration to say that FedAc-
count could rival the 1933 advent of federal deposit insurance as a
stabilizing force. By making pure sovereign money widely available in
"account" form, FedAccount would crowd out runnable cash
equivalents, all but eliminating a primary cause of macroeconomic
disasters.
History has shown repeatedly that runnable cash equivalents-
basically, the financial sector's short-term and demandable debt-pre-
sent a grave threat to the broader economy. Widespread runs on cash
equivalents, or "panics," invariably cause or amplify deep recessions.
They do massive damage to the real economy. Every major panic (or
cluster of panics) in the United States since the Civil War-1873, 1893,
1907, 1930-1933, and 2007-2008-has been accompanied by a severe
95 About Federal Reserve Bank Services, FED. RSRV., https://frbservices.org/about/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/D3VM-A56D].
96 FedAccount would have significantly reduced the costs and delays involved in providing
stimulus in response to the COVID-19 crisis. See Morgan Ricks & Lev Menand, Opinion, Let's
Pay the Stimulus in Digital Dollars, BLOOMBERG - QUINT (Mar. 24, 2020, 10:01 PM), https://
www.bloombergquint.com/gadfly/coronavirus-stimulus-let-s-pay-it-in-digital-dollars [https://
perma.cc/8ABV-TW3B].
97 See Excerpt from Banks and Credit Unions Industry Profile, DUN & BRADSTREET FIRST





recession, and most of the worst recessions have been accompanied by
panics.98 "[B]anking panics," wrote Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz in their seminal study of U.S. monetary history, "have oc-
curred only during severe contractions and have greatly intensified
such contractions, if indeed they have not been the primary factor
converting what would otherwise have been mild contractions into se-
vere ones."99
This problem is not unique to the United States. Walter Bage-
hot's canonical nineteenth-century writings on central banking
stemmed from his recognition that panics in the money market endan-
gered England's economy.100 In modern times, the onset of Sweden's
sharp, deep recession in the early 1990s coincided with a massive run
on its financial sector's krona-denominated short-term debt obliga-
tions.101 Similarly, Japan's acute recession beginning in late 1997 coin-
cided with a sudden run on the yen-denominated short-term debt of
its financial institutions.102 Panics are, and always have been, far and
away the biggest danger the financial system poses to the broader
economy.103
Although deposit insurance basically ended runs on deposits,104
modern panics have involved runs on institutional deposit substitutes.
The 2008 financial crisis featured a run on dollar-denominated cash
equivalents such as asset-backed and financial commercial paper,
repo, Eurodollars, auction-rate securities, prime brokerage free credit
balances, and money market mutual fund shares.105 The Swedish and
Japanese episodes just mentioned were similar. It is important to un-
98 For information on major U.S. panics and output contractions before World War I, see
Andrew J. Jalil, A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825-1929: Construction
and Implications, AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS, July 2015, at 295, 323, 328.
99 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 441-42 (1963).
100 See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET
17 (3d. ed. 1873) (noting that in the event of a major panic "our banking system and our indus-
trial system too would be in great danger").
101 See Peter Englund & Vesa Vihrizih, Financial Crisis in Finland and Sweden: Similar But
Not Quite the Same, in THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN 71, 90 (Lars
Jonung et al. eds., 2009).
102 See Karube Kensuke, Lessons of the 1997 Financial Crisis in Japan, NIPPON (Oct. 30,
2017), https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00360/ [https://perma.cc/F7Y3-YXYW].
103 For an extensive treatment of this point, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM:
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 102-42 (2016).
104 See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 13-14
(2010) (describing how the enactment of deposit nsurance led to a seventy-five-year panic-free
"Quiet Period" in U.S. financial history).
105 See RICKS, supra note 103, at 96-97.
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derstand that, like deposits and redeemable bank notes, these other
types of financial sector short-term debt are privately issued "money":
they satisfy money demand. Accounting standards classify them as
cash equivalents,'106 and central banks often include some of them in
their broad measures of the money supply.107 Leading economists re-
fer to these short-term debt instruments as "forms of money" or "pri-
vate money." 08 A Fed governor recently acknowledged that their
"private creation . . . is, at least to some degree, the creation of
money."lo9
FedAccount would offer directly to businesses and other institu-
tions what they are really looking for when they pile into cash
equivalents: riskless money with a positive yield. Many large busi-
nesses hold tens of billions of dollars in privately issued cash
equivalents.110 No business would hold a bank account of this size,
given the risk of bank failure and default. Because FedAccounts
would consist of fiat base money, they would not be susceptible to
default any more than a dollar bill can default."' FedAccount would
offer a compelling alternative to private cash equivalents: pure sover-
eign money paying the IOR rate, an asset currently available only to
banks.1"2 FedAccount would thus crowd out-and forestall the
106 See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
No. 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS 6 (1987).
107 See What Is the Money Supply? Is It Important?, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12845.htm#:~:text=there%20are%20several%20standard
%20measures,accounts%20at %20the%20Federal%20Reserve [https://perma.cc/649V-PH67].
108 E.g., GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 5 (2012) (calling them
"forms of money"); Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 O.J.
ECON. 57, 57-58 (2012) (calling them "private 'money"'); John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free
Financial System, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
197, 224 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014) ("Short-term debt is money.").
109 Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Opening Remarks
at Center for American Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference: Exploring
Shadow Banking: Can the Nation Avoid the Next Crisis? 6 (July 12, 2016).
110 Where Companies Keep Their Cash, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 6, 2011), https://
www.marketplace.org/2011/10/06/where-companies-keep-their-cash/ [https://perma.cc/9JJ5-
GCH6].
111 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 411 (requiring Fed notes to "be redeemed in lawful money on
demand"), with 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (stating that Fed notes are legal tender). Here, this Article
echoes Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 13 n.30 (1998).
112 See infra Section I.D. Some may be concerned that FedAccount would increase insta-
bility in times of financial stress as holders of deposits and private cash equivalents flocked to
FedAccounts. These concerns are misplaced. FedAccount would substantially reduce the size of
cash equivalent markets, reducing the scale of the problem, to begin with. Also, insured U.S.
retail deposits are very sticky and have proved not to be run-prone; there is no reason why
FedAccount would materially change this. As for wholesale money-claimants, they already
run-mostly to J.P. Morgan and to Treasury bills and government-only money market mutual
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reemergence of-runnable cash equivalents.113 By expanding its bal-
ance sheet postcrisis, the Fed has significantly reduced the size of the
private cash equivalent markets.114 FedAccount would supercharge
this crowding out and make it permanent.115
D. Monetary Policy Transmission
If broadly adopted, FedAccount would improve both the efficacy
and the distributional fairness of monetary policy. To see why requires
a bit of background.
In late 2008, the Fed started paying interest to banks on their
central bank accounts for the first time.116 This was a revolutionary
shift in the Fed's operational approach to monetary policy. Before
then, U.S. central bank accounts paid no interest, and the Fed influ-
enced market interest rates by keeping bank reserves scarce and ad-
justing their supply.1"7 But today, when the Fed wants to raise the
federal funds rate (its main target rate for monetary policy) and other
market interest rates, it pays more interest to banks on their ac-
counts118 These interest payments are called interest on reserves or
IOR.119 The theory is that IOR will "pass through" to market interest
funds. It is far from obvious why running to FedAccounts would be worse. It would be better
because it would improve the Fed's visibility into crises. Finally, the notion that we should not
expand access to sovereign "account money" because it might destabilize private money is, if
anything, an indictment of private money.
113 Cf Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, The Federal Reserve's
Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool, FED. RSRV. BD. KAN. CITY ECON. POL'Y. SYMP.,
Aug. 2016, at 335, 335 (proposing that the Fed use its balance sheet to weaken incentives for
financial institutions to issue runnable "short-term liabilities").
114 See Sarah Foster, What is the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet?, BANKRATE (July 8,
2020), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/federal-reserve/federal-reserve-balance-sheet/ [https://
perma.cc/XL6D-AZQ5] (stating that the Fed expanded its balance sheet in 2008 by buying "debt
and mortgage-backed securities").
115 Professor Ricks has argued that restricting entry into (dollar-denominated) "money"
creation on a functional basis would be both feasible and desirable. See RICKS, supra note 103, at
230-37; Morgan Ricks, Entry Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the Structure of Monetary Institu-
tions, 2 J. FIN. REG. 291, 294 (2016). Entry restriction could complement the crowding-out ap-
proach if the latter proved less than fully successful.
116 In 2006, Congress authorized the Fed to begin paying interest on reserves beginning
October 1, 2011. See Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351,
§§ 201, 203, 120 Star. 1966, 1968-69. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 acceler-
ated the effective date to October 1, 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 128, 122 Star. 3765, 3796.
117 See JOHN R. WALTER & RENEE COURTOIS, FED. RSRV. BANK OF RICHMOND, THE EF-
FECT OF INTEREST ON RESERVES ON MONETARY POLICY 1-2 (2009), https://
www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic-brief/2009/pdf/
eb_09-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5A-F25Y].
118 See id. at 1, 3.
119 See id. at 1.
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rates, allowing the Fed to control inflation and influence
macroeconomic conditions.120
Problematically, pass-through has been lackluster: for the great
majority of the IOR era that began in late 2008, the federal funds rate
has remained below the IOR rate,12' and other money market rates
have stayed even lower.2 2 Weak pass-through raises two big
problems. First, it hamstrings monetary policy. The Fed's monetary
policy will not affect the economy as desired if market interest rates
do not cooperate. Second, poor pass-through means banks are getting
a windfall at the public's expense. Entities receiving IOR but not pass-
ing it through are extracting economic rents.12 3 The Fed has sought to
address the first problem (efficacy) by paying interest to a broader set
of financial institutions.124 But there are reasons to think this only
makes the second problem (distribution) worse.125
120 See id. at 4.
121 Id. at 2.
122 See Josh Frost, Lorie Logan, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, Fabio Natalucci, & Julie
Remache, Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations 1
(Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2015-010, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econ-
resdata/feds/2015/files/2015010pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VUQ-K35J].
123 See Is the Federal Reserve Giving Banks a $12bn Subsidy?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/03/18/is-the-federal-reserve-giving-
banks-a-12bn-subsidy [https://perma.cc/4SMJ-JSR2]; Ann Saphir, Yellen Draws Fire for Fed Pol-
icy to Pay Banks, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 3:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-
yellen-politics/yellen-draws-fire-for-fed-policy-to-pay-banks-idUSL2N15P1Z7 [https://perma.cc/
C8ZU-FENB]. The dollar amounts will become much larger if rates rise. See Erin E. Syron
Ferris, Soo Jeong Kim & Bernd Schlusche, Confidence Interval Projections of the Federal Reserve
Balance Sheet and Income, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2017/confidence-interval-projections-of-
the-federal-reserve-balance-sheet-and-income-20170113.html [https://perma.cc/YMH4-Q9TY].
In 2016 certain financial market utilities were permitted to open Fed accounts, which they seem
to like. See Katy Burne, Clearinghouses Park Billions in New Fed Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
23, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clearinghouses-park-billions-in-new-fed-accounts-
1479897004 [https://perma.cc/V8E7-RYFH] ("Financial firms are lining up for the hottest new
account on Wall Street: checking with interest at the Federal Reserve.").
124 See Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreement Facility, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV.
SYS. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/overnight-reverse-repur-
chase-agreements.htm [https://perma.cc/9RGK-TNQ6]; Frost et al., supra note 122, at chart 3.
125 See Darrell Duffie & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Pass-Through Efficiency in the Fed's New
Monetary Policy Setting, FED. RSRV. BANK KAN. CITY POL'Y SYMP., Aug. 2016, at 21, 22 (devel-
oping a model in which an increase in average pass-through to all money markets is achieved
with a reduction in pass-through to the average rate paid on bank deposits). But see Simon
Potter, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Money Markets at a Crossroads: Policy
Implementation at a Time of Structural Change, Remarks at the Master of Applied Economics'




Broad adoption of FedAccounts would ameliorate or eliminate
these problems. Pass-through problems exist only because central
bank accounts are restricted to an exclusive clientele through which
the central bank seeks to "pass" interest. With FedAccount, the Fed
would pay the IOR rate directly to individuals and nonbank busi-
nesses and institutions, rendering pass-through moot. The result
would be a more effective and equitable approach to monetary policy
implementation.12 6
E. Eliminating Tolls (Interchange)
FedAccount would not charge any tolls on payments. This issue is
most salient today with debit card transactions. Debit cards are the
predominant noncash payment method in the United States as mea-
sured by number of transactions.127 Most debit cards support both
"signature-based" and "PIN-based" transactions, which use different
authorization, clearing, and settlement protocols. The vast majority of
signature-based transactions are routed through Visa or Master-
Card.128  Another dozen or so networks handle PIN-based
transactions.129
Were the Fed to manage its debit card operations like any other
bank, it would join one or more signature-based and PIN-based net-
works and enable those networks on its cards. FedAccount-linked
debit cards (call them FedCards) would then work at point-of-sale ter-
minals and ATM machines in the United States and abroad. Card-
issuing banks that join these networks receive fees-"interchange
fees"-when their cards are used in transactions. Interchange fees are
set by the networks and charged to merchants when cardholders
transact with them.130 These fees are a substantial source of revenue
126 See Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 102 (arguing that "central bank electronic
money for all" would avoid political economy issues that arise from paying IOR only to select
financial institutions).
127 See FED. RSRV. Sys., supra note 44, at 4.
128 See Yizhu Wang & Christopher Kane, PIN-Based Debit Processing Market Could Bene-
fit from Consolidation, Industry Experts Say, NILSON REP. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://nilsonre-
port.com/featured-articles/pin-based-debit-processing-market-could-benefit-from-consolidation-
industry-experts-say/ [https://perma.cc/SD3N-86XB].
129 See id. MasterCard and Visa also maintain PIN networks, called Maestro and Interlink,
respectively. See id. PIN-based networks are sometimes called Electronic Funds Transfer or EFT
networks. See FUMIKO HAYASHI, RICHARD SULLIVAN & STUART E. WEINER, A GUIDE TO THE
ATM AND DEBIT CARD INDUSTRY 6-7 (2003).
130 While the fees are technically charged to the merchant's bank (the "merchant ac-
quirer"), they are passed on to merchants through a merchant discount. Id. at 5-6, 9.
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for debit card issuers,'131 notwithstanding federal regulation of in-
terchange rates.132 Card networks also charge per-transaction "net-
work fees," which are smaller than interchange fees but still
substantial.133
For its first sixty years, the Fed fought doggedly, and ultimately
successfully, to end "nonpar banking," whereby some banks would
charge fees to pay checks drawn upon them.134 Merchants generally
paid these fees to their customers' banks.135 Congressman Carter
Glass called the fees "tollgates upon the highways of commerce."136
Debit card interchange fees are nonpar banking resurrected. Payment
tolls are an impediment to commerce, a spillover-rich activity. And
resource overuse is simply not a concern here. The electronic payment
system is not realistically depletable or congestible. Ideally, the Fed
would not accept any interchange fees at all from FedCard
transactions.
The best way to avoid interchange and network fees would be to
bypass the existing card networks.137 Fortunately, the Fed is well posi-
tioned to do just this. The Fed already processes payments by its ac-
count holders through Fedwire, its venerable real-time payments
network.1 38 Once central bank accounts are made available to the gen-
131 BENJAMIN KAY, MARK D. MANUSZAK & CINDY M. VOJTECH, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RSRV. SYS., BANK PROFITABILITY AND DEBIT CARD INTERCHANGE REGULATION:
BANK RESPONSES TO THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 3 (2014) ("In 2010, interchange income was
about 5 percent of total noninterest income for banks in our data.").
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (requiring that interchange transaction fees be "reasona-
ble and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction"); 12
C.F.R. § 235.3 (2020) (defining reasonable and proportional interchange fees as no more than
twenty-one cents plus the product of five basis points and the value of the transaction).
133 See generally WELLS FARGO MERCH. SERVS., PIN DEBIT NETWORKS FEE SCHEDULE:
MARCH - MAY 2020 (2020) (describing networks' interchange, switch, and annual network fees).
134 For a capsule history, see Developing an Efficient Payments System, FED. RSRV. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS (Aug. 1, 1988), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/1988/developing-an-effi-
cient-payments-system [https://perma.cc/JM9D-RACD]; Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 737, 753-54, 758 n.75 (1978); and FED. RSRV. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 124-25 (10th ed. 2016).
135 See Scott, supra note 134, at 754.
136 53 CONG. REC. 14,089 (1916) (statement of Hon. Carter Glass before the American
Bankers' Association at Richmond, Virginia).
137 Cf Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal
Reserve 14 (Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., Business, Economics and Regulatory Policy Working Paper No.
1420061, 2009) (arguing "that 'the [Fed] could enhance competition in payment card markets
by"' establishing its own "FedNet" payment card network (quoting Thomas M. Hoenig, Presi-
dent, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Kan. City, Future of Retail Banking and Payments, Developments in
Global Markets: The Role of Central Banks (May 25, 2009))).
138 Fedwire's lineage dates to 1918 when the Fed established telegraphic systems to admin-
ister payments. See Adam M. Gilbert, Dara Hunt & Kenneth C. Winch, Creating an Integrated
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eral public, Fedwire should be able to handle the associated payments,
including those initiated by FedCards. Fedwire currently processes
payments to the tune of $3 trillion per day.139 Fedwire participants
send electronic messages to the Fed instructing it to debit their Fed
accounts and credit payees' accounts.140 This, of course, is just what
card networks do. Opening Fedwire to FedCard-based payments
would not require any new, distributed physical infrastructure. Ex-
isting point-of-sale terminals are quite versatile and can route pay-
ments to numerous networks.141 Existing telecommunications rails
handle all electronic payment messages, including card-based transac-
tions and Fedwire transactions. Fedwire would just need to be con-
figured to accommodate payment card messaging protocols.
By not charging interchange or network fees for FedCard transac-
tions processed over Fedwire, the Fed would give merchants a strong
incentive to route FedCard payments through the Fedwire network,
whether or not they used FedAccounts themselves. Federal regulation
already prohibits card networks from inhibiting merchants' ability to
route debit card transactions to any network that may process them.142
So merchants would pay no interchange or network fees when ac-
cepting payment via FedCard, provided they routed such payments to
Fedwire.143 Reducing aggregate interchange fees would be a boon to
merchants. Ultimately, the benefits would be passed along to consum-
ers in the form of lower prices for goods and services.
Non-card-based payments would not be subject to fees either;
they too would be processed through Fedwire. Peer-to-peer payments
between FedAccounts would be processed for free, as would wire
transfers and bill payments from FedAccounts. Existing Fedwire fees
would be eliminated, returning the Fed to its old system of free in-
terbank transfers.144 By removing all per-transaction fixed and ad
Payment System: The Evolution of Fedwire, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., July
1997, at 1, 1-2.
139 Fedwire Funds Service-Monthly Statistics, FED. RSRV. BANK SERVS., https://frbser-
vices.org/resources/financial-services/wires/volume-value-stats/monthly-stats.html [https://
perma.cc/9YQX-PZ3F].
140 See Gilbert et al., supra note 138, at 2.
141 See FIRST DATA, PAYMENTS 101: CREDIT AND DEBIT CARD PAYMENTS: KEY CONCEPTS
AND INDUSTRY ISSUES 6-8 (2010).
142 See 12 C.F.R. § 235.7(b) (2020).
143 So long as FedCards were also enabled on other signature- and PIN-based networks,
FedCard payments could be routed to those networks as well, but in that case, the merchant
would pointlessly pay interchange and network fees.
144 The Fed generally did not charge banks for Fedwire and other payment system services
until Congress required it to do so in 1980. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
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valorem fees from payments, FedAccount would create a frictionless
system, like email. The system as a whole would be financed out of
seigniorage revenue, as described in Section II.G.
F. Regulatory Streamlining
FedAccount would create opportunities to rationalize and sim-
plify the existing U.S. financial regulatory regime. For example, many
rules that have been promulgated since the financial crisis are directly
or indirectly geared toward limiting financial institutions' fragile
short-term debt funding.145 By crowding out this fragile funding
model, FedAccount would reduce or eliminate the need for these
complicated regulations. Rules have also been developed to impose
enhanced prudential standards on firms that the market might per-
ceive as "too big to fail."1 4 6 One side effect of FedAccount would
likely be to reduce the size of the largest U.S. financial institutions. To
the extent that these firms, due to their size and wide range of activi-
ties, are harder to supervise14 7 or enjoy subsidies because of a market
perception that they are too big to fail, 48 FedAccount would bring
them more in line with other large regional banks and reduce their
systemic importance. Additionally, some rules promulgated to protect
consumers from abusive products could potentially be pared back as
more consumers and institutions transitioned to FedAccounts. These
changes would reduce the burden on financial regulatory agencies.
G. Fiscal Revenue (Seigniorage)
Rather than weigh on the government's fiscal position, FedAc-
count will probably generate revenue. Central banks' asset portfolio
tary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 107, 94 Stat. 132, 140-41 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 248a). See generally Anatoli Kuprianov, The Monetary Control Act and the Role of the Federal
Reserve in the Interbank Clearing Market, FED. RSRV. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. July/Aug.
1985, at 23 (recounting the history of this legislation).
145 See 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"));
id. § 5322(a)(2)(H) (empowering the FSOC to designate nonbanks for heightened supervision);
Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards and Disclosure Require-
ments, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,124 (proposed June 1, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249).
146 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (providing for enhanced supervision and prudential standards
for certain bank holding companies).
147 See Lev Menand, Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the
Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2018).
148 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1009 (2011),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C24-
XAZ7]. See generally Gara Afonso, Joao A.C. Santos & James Traina, Do "Too-Big-To-Fail"
Banks Take On More Risk?, J. FIN. PERSP., July 2015, at 1 (measuring government support for
large banks and evaluating consequences).
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returns typically exceed their interest payments and other expenses by
a wide margin. These earnings are called "seigniorage," meaning fiscal
revenue from money creation. The amounts are large. The Fed remit-
ted $81 billion, $65 billion, and $55 billion in earnings to the United
States Treasury Department in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.149 If
FedAccount expanded the Fed's balance sheet,150 remittances could
increase substantially, even after accounting for the costs of maintain-
ing millions of retail accounts.151 Incremental portfolio earnings would
likely exceed FedAccount expenses, especially if FedAccounts attracts
large businesses and institutions as expected.
Not only would this additional fiscal revenue not be economically
distortive, it would actually remove existing distortions. The financial
sector's short-term and demandable debt amounts to privately issued
money.152 Because cash equivalent instruments satisfy money demand,
they are a source of extraordinarily cheap funding to their issuers.153
This cheapness is further enhanced by implicit public backstops. Pri-
vate money issuers thereby capture seigniorage revenue from the pub-
lic by piggybacking on the state.154 FedAccount would allow the public
to recapture this leaked seigniorage. Increased fiscal revenue would
thus reflect an efficient reduction in rent extraction-a reversal of ex-
isting wealth transfers from the public to the financial sector.155
149 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Announces Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2019
(Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20200110a.htm
[https://perma.cc/6AV4-JSF5].
150 See supra Section IILA.
151 The Fed's liabilities consist mostly of "base money," which is comprised of reserve ac-
counts and currency in circulation. Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD.
GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
bstfrliabilities.htm [https://perma.cc/Q9W4-PMSU]. The Fed creates these liabilities by purchas-
ing interest-bearing debt instruments. Id. FedAccounts would increase base money, thereby si-
multaneously increasing the interest-bearing debt instruments the Fed holds in its portfolio.
152 See Tarullo, supra note 109, at 6; supra text accompanying note 109.
153 See Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A Comparative-Advan-
tage Approach to Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FIN. 1683, 1709 (2015).
154 See id. at 1705 (referring to the value derived from issuing money-like instruments as
"seigniorage"); CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF
CAPITALISM 414-21 (2014) (discussing private capture of "seigniorage"); Frank D. Graham, Par-
tial Reserve Money and the 100 Per Cent Proposal, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 430 (1936) (noting
that banks earn "seigniorage profits"); Ulrich Bindseil, Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational
Frameworks, FED. RSRV. BD. KAN. CITY ECON. POL'Y. SYMP., Aug. 2016, at 179, 190 (referring
to "'seigniorage' income of banks").
155 Cf SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE HIGH PRICE OF GOLD BULLION, REPORT, 1810, HC, at
30-31 (UK) (noting during England's suspension of convertibility that bank money creation,
"enabled under the protection of the law ... at a very trifling expense," was "prejudicial to the
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III. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Having described FedAccount and its benefits, this Article now
takes a broader, system-wide perspective. What would FedAccount
mean for the central bank and the larger financial system? What
makes FedAccount better than other CBDC designs currently being
debated and, in some cases, implemented?156 And how does FedAc-
count compare with other major banking reform proposals-narrow
banking and postal banking-that share broadly similar, or at least
overlapping, motivations? This Part answers each of these questions.
A. Banking, Central Banking, and "Intermediation"
Large-scale adoption of FedAccounts would require a perma-
nently large central bank balance sheet, a prospect that even the Fed
has embraced since it resumed balance sheet expansion in October
2019.157 Such a permanent expansion would force some choices re-
garding the Fed's asset portfolio. Tracing these choices will reveal
some of FedAccount's deeper, structural implications.
Perhaps the best way to begin is by outlining the institutional
mechanics of large-scale migration from bank deposit accounts to
FedAccounts. The migration can be broken down into three some-
what stylized phases. Because banks currently hold enormous excess
reserve balances, the first phase would consist of reserve drainage.
Banks' balance sheets would shrink as their deposit liabilities and re-
serve assets declined in tandem. During this initial phase, migration to
FedAccounts would not affect the Fed's balance sheet size. The Fed's
assets would stay the same and its liabilities would shift in composi-
tion-from accounts held by banks to accounts held by nonbanks-
but not in amount.
public welfare" and that, barring some other remedy, "some mode ought to be derived of ena-
bling the State to participate much more largely in the profits accruing from" that issuance).
156 See Chen Ye & Kevin C. Desouza, The Current Landscape of Central Bank Digital
Currencies, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/
13/the-current-landscape-of-central-bank-digital-currencies/ [https://perma.cc/TUV9-K5N8]
(describing CBDC exploration and implementation in other countries).
157 Compare FED. OPEN MKT. COMM., POLICY NORMALIZATION PRINCIPLES AND PLANS
(2014) (stating plan to normalize the balance sheet in 2014), with Press Release, Fed. Rsrv.,
Balance Sheet Normalization Principles and Plans 1 (Mar. 20, 2019) ("[T]he Committee intends
to slow the pace of the decline in reserves over coming quarters provided that the economy and
money market conditions evolve about as expected."); and Press Release, Fed. Rsrv., Statement
Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation 1 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("[T]he Federal Reserve will
purchase Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of next year in order to maintain over
time ample reserve balances at or above the level that prevailed in early September 2019.").
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Eventually, bank reserves would become scarce, and further mi-
gration to FedAccounts would risk creating bank liquidity shortages.
To avoid this, the Fed would extend discount window loans to offset
banks' lost deposit balances.158 In this second phase, banks' balance
sheets would stop shrinking. Their assets would stay the same and
their liabilities would shift in composition-from deposit accounts to
discount window borrowings-but not in amount. Concomitantly, in
this phase the Fed's balance sheet would grow as incremental discount
window lending matched incremental FedAccount balances. In effect,
the central bank would "step in" as counterparty between migrating
account holders and commercial banks.159
The central bank should charge actuarially fair rates for its dis-
count window loans. This rate can be expressed as Rf + P, where Rf is
the risk-free rate corresponding to the loan's duration and P is a risk
premium reflecting bank-specific default risk. Rf is observable in the
financial markets, but P requires valuation. Some might doubt the
central bank's capacity to do this kind of valuation. As long as deposit
insurance exists, however, the government must do this anyway. Since
1991, U.S. deposit insurance fees have been keyed to individual banks'
default risks.160 Calculating these fees is isomorphic to estimating P.
They are the same thing. So, to the extent that FedAccount balances
represent migration of insured bank deposits, the government as a
whole neither assumes new risks nor undertakes new valuation func-
tions. Risk-bearing and valuation are merely being relocated from one
government agency to another.
True, not only insured depositors but also holders of (ostensibly)
uninsured claims-deposit balances in excess of $250,000 as well as
nondeposit claims, such as money market mutual fund shares-would
migrate to FedAccounts.161 But the government effectively bears
much of this risk already. In the 2008 financial crisis, the FDIC re-
158 Ideally, these loans would be unsecured and pari passu with remaining deposits-in
other words, identical in seniority and collateralization to the deposit funding being replaced-
so as not to disadvantage any remaining depositors holding uninsured balances. This would re-
quire minor amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, which contemplates that all discount win-
dow loans be secured. See Federal Reserve Act § 10B(a), 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a).
159 This is called "novation."
160 The FDIC charges "risk-based" deposit insurance fees, albeit in a somewhat crude way.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b); 12 C.F.R.§ 327 (2020).
161 The Fed could also lend to nonbanks under its section 13(3) powers to replace lost repo
funding and other forms of short-term wholesale funding, provided it deemed the circumstances
"unusual and exigent." See Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3). Unlike
discount window loans, some of which the Fed might want to keep outstanding indefinitely (see
below), any section 13(3) liquidity should be strictly transitional. Minor amendments to section
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moved the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance coverage for transaction
accounts.162 The U.S. Treasury Department fully guaranteed money
market mutual fund shares.163 The Fed's crisis-related facilities were
designed largely to prevent defaults on uninsured money-like claims
issued by financial institutions.164 It is wishful thinking to believe that
such claims are not largely government-backed. However difficult it
may be to estimate P, the correct answer is not zero. Implicit and un-
compensated public insurance transfers wealth from the public to the
financial sector. Replacing financial institutions' short-term and de-
mandable debt funding with discount window lending would increase
fiscal revenue while also reducing economic rent extraction.165
In the third and final phase, the central bank would gradually im-
plement its desired asset portfolio. The central bank is not obliged to
maintain discount window credit indefinitely. It may choose to substi-
tute other assets over time in an orderly fashion. Its decisions in this
regard will depend on two predominant factors. First, the central bank
should value safety. Although central bank "solvency" is not espe-
cially important from an operational standpoint-central bank liabili-
ties are not liabilities in any meaningful economic sense-the central
bank might prefer to avoid the optics of negative equity.166 More sub-
stantively, volatile assets would mean volatile seigniorage remittances,
interfering with desirable fiscal smoothing.167 Second, the central bank
should value liquidity. By transacting in impersonal, liquid markets
with observable market prices, the Fed reduces the need for valuation,
relying instead on capital market efficiency to prevent it from system-
atically overpaying. These two considerations suggest steering the
portfolio toward very high-quality, liquid bonds, such as U.S. Treasury
securities.
13(3) might be in order to permit the Fed to supply liquidity to money market funds, which
typically cannot borrow.
162 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008-2013, at
xii (2017) (stating that the FDIC "provided an unlimited deposit insurance guarantee" for some
transaction accounts).
163 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guaran-
tee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008).
164 See RICKS, supra note 103, at 99-101.
165 See supra Section II.G.
166 See generally Igor Goncharov, Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, (Why) Do Cen-
tral Banks Care About Their Profits? (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6546, 2017) (exploring factors
behind central banks' preference for profitability).
167 Cf JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 585 (2d ed. 2007) (argu-
ing the desirability of tax smoothing).
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Problematically, there may not always be enough Treasury securi-
ties to accommodate the desired money supply. This has been a recur-
ring problem in American monetary history.168 FedAccount, which
could require an especially large central bank balance sheet, might
compound it. Presumably, we would want the monetary system to
work even if the government consistently balanced its budget.169 Nor
would expanding into safe and liquid private bonds necessarily ensure
sufficient investment options. Market depth is limited, and the central
bank could end up dominating these markets, pushing asset prices
around and distorting credit allocation.170 Optimal portfolio composi-
tion therefore cannot be determined a priori. It depends on the availa-
ble supply of suitable investment assets in relation to the desired base
money supply (which is a function of monetary policy).
In the face of a limited supply of safe and liquid bonds, the cen-
tral bank could relax the safety criterion or the liquidity criterion or
both. Relaxing the safety criterion would mean extending into riskier
but still highly liquid assets, like corporate stocks. Not only would this
168 See Marvin Goodfriend, Policy Debates at the Federal Open Market Committee:
1993-2002, in THE ORIGINS, HISTORY, AND FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 332, 355-56
(Michael D. Bordo & William Roberds eds., 2013) (describing the Fed's contingency planning in
early 2000 when government debt was being paid down); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA'S
BANK: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE 14 (2015) (noting that in the
late nineteenth century national banks' bank note issuance "was determined by the level of
investment in government bonds, and this bore no relation to the needs of trade"); ROBERT E.
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 21 (1987) (describing the same).
169 It would be unwise to force the government o adapt its fiscal posture to meet the econ-
omy's monetary needs. See Morgan Ricks, Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve
Banking, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 113, 117-22 (2016) (describing "fiscal-monetary
entanglement").
170 The European Central Bank ("ECB") has become a major player in investment-grade
corporate bond markets since entering those markets in 2016. See, e.g., Thomas Hale, ECB Bond
Buying Transforms Universe of Top Tier Debt, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/ad44f9b4-d375-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44 [https://perma.cc/6A2D-NVKH] ("Alongside a
reduction in the outstanding universe of highly-rated assets, the sheer volume of purchases has
placed huge downward pressure on bond yields."). The ECB seeks to make these purchases
while "avoiding undue market distortions." The ECB's Corporate Sector Purchase Programme:
Its Implementation and Impact, ECB ECON. BULL., no. 4, 2017, at 40, 41. Its success in this regard
is debatable. See, e.g., Sid Verma, These 'Anomalous' Spreads Show How the ECB's Been Dis-
torting Bond Markets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2017, 3:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-04-06/these-anomalous-spreads-show-the-ecb-distorting-bond-markets [h tps://
perma.cc/Q6SA-VNUA] (summarizing a market analyst's argument that the ECB's corporate
bond purchases have "distorted the relative value of debt issued by a number of European com-
panies."). Relatedly, the Federal Open Market Committee has stated its intention that the Fed
will "hold primarily Treasury securities, thereby minimizing the effect of Federal Reserve hold-
ings on the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy." FED. OPEN MKT. COMM., supra
note at 157, at 1.
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increase the risk of negative equity and make seigniorage revenue
choppier, but it could put the central bank in the awkward position of
exercising corporate governance rights. Relaxing the liquidity crite-
rion would mean venturing into less liquid (though still high quality)
credit markets, perhaps even direct lending to creditworthy borrow-
ers. Valuation would become much more important, as capital market
efficiency would not afford protection against overpaying. And the ap-
pearance or reality of politically motivated favoritism would become
acute.
In view of these problems, the central bank might see considera-
ble upside in keeping a substantial quantity of discount window credit
outstanding indefinitely. This can be understood as portfolio manage-
ment outsourcing. Chartered institutions receiving discount window
credit-call them member banks-are controlled by residual claim-
ants (stockholders) that have incentives to invest well. The central
bank thus harnesses private incentives and expertise to allocate re-
sources through individualized, information-intensive credit under-
writing. This arrangement also insulates the central bank's investment
function from the appearance or reality of political meddling and fa-
voritism. The central bank would hold senior claims on portfolios of
senior claims-a relatively safe, though by no means riskless, position.
Figure 1 compares FedAccount to the current U.S. money-and-
banking system. It assumes a boundary case of full migration to
FedAccounts, with no bank deposits remaining. The figure offers sev-
eral key takeaways. First, the central bank's balance sheet is much
larger under FedAccount than in the current system. To the extent
that deposits are explicitly or implicitly insured in the current system,
however, FedAccount does not cause the government o assume more
risk. That the FDIC's contingent obligations are "off balance sheet" is
a matter of accounting, not economic substance. Second, under
FedAccount the government accrues seigniorage revenue from mem-
ber banks through discount window lending. By contrast, deposit
banks in the current system are not a source of fiscal revenue; deposit
insurance fees flow to the deposit insurance fund and are suspended
when it is fully funded.'7'
171 Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), the FDIC was required to declare "dividends"
from the deposit insurance fund to participating deposit banks once the fund reached a certain
size in relation to outstanding insured eposits. E.g., Financial Institution Letters: Deposit Insur-
ance Assessments: Final Rule on Assessment Dividends, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Oct. 18, 2006),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2006/fi06092.html [https://perma.cc/27AC-
DKY6] (stating that the FDIC must "pay dividends from the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) to
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FIGURE 1. CURRENT SYSTEM VERSUS FEDACCOUNT
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Third, migration to FedAccounts would not necessarily affect the
quantity or cost of credit in the broader economy. If all migrating
insured institutions when the DIF reserve ratio at the end of a calendar year exceeds 1.35 per-
cent."). Dodd-Frank gave the FDIC discretion to suspend or limit the declaration of dividends.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 332, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(e). Even as modified, though, the deposit insurance
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bank deposits were replaced dollar-for-dollar with discount window
loans, the quantity of bank credit would be unaffected.172 Some might
suppose that, because banks' average cost of funds would rise, banks
would raise their lending rates, increasing borrowing costs in the econ-
omy and decreasing the quantity of bank loans. But banks' lending
decisions are usually thought to be determined by their marginal cost
of funds, or the federal funds rate.73 Holding monetary policy con-
stant, this rate would be unchanged postmigration. There is strong em-
pirical evidence of a disconnect between banks' lending rates and
their deposit costs. Specifically, bank deposit rates respond asymmet-
rically to moves in the federal funds rate: when the federal funds rate
declines, banks quickly reduce deposit rates, but when it rises, banks
are very slow to raise deposit rates.17 4 According to one study, sluggish
deposit rate adjustments cost depositors $100 billion per year during
rising rate environments.175 By contrast, the prime rate (the standard
bank lending benchmark) adjusts instantly when the federal funds rate
rises.176 It seems that banks capture much of the benefit of cheap de-
posit funding rather than "passing it along" to borrowers.
Even if banks' lending rates did rise after depositors migrated to
FedAccounts, would this be a bad thing?177 Suppose that some of
banks' current funding subsidy does pass through to bank borrowers
as a credit subsidy. Proponents of credit subsidies bear the burden of
showing a market failure. Assuming for the sake of argument this case
can be made, it remains to be asked whether subsidizing banks' fund-
ing is a sensible way of subsidizing credit. As just shown, banks them-
selves capture much of this subsidy. And more targeted subsidies for
particular credit classes-say, student loans, small business loans, or
residential mortgages-may be more effective. The U.S. federal gov-
172 Banks currently hold about 35% of U.S. loans and 9% of U.S. debt securities, equating
to about 20% of the $70 trillion U.S. debt markets; these figures need not change at all. See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. Sys., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 117, 123 (2020).
173 See, e.g., WALTER & COURTOIS, supra note 117, at 2.
174 See John C. Driscoll & Ruth A. Judson, Sticky Deposit Rates 2-3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd. Fin.
and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2013-80, 2013).
175 Id. at 3.
176 Id. at 14.
177 Cf Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 427
(2016) ("One concern about Pure Reserve Banking might be that it could result in a contraction
of credit. It is not clear that this would be the case. Much depends on how much consumers and
businesses really want to assume credit risk. . .. To the extent that there is a contraction of credit,




ernment already subsidizes these credit classes through dedicated pro-
grams.178 Although this Article expresses no view on the merits of
these programs as currently implemented-or for that matter on
whether credit subsidies (as opposed to other uses of public resources)
are a good way of doing public policy179-these programs do show
that other, more direct ways of administering credit subsidies are fea-
sible. Moreover, as a quantitative matter, there is no reason to sup-
pose that the magnitude of banks' funding subsidies-which arise
from a combination of underpriced and intermittently suspended de-
posit insurance fees, implicit guarantees, and seigniorage extraction-
bears any relation to the optimal credit subsidy (if any). Finally, if
bank lending rates did rise postmigration and this had a
macroeconomic impact, the central bank would respond with mone-
tary easing through balance sheet expansion or a lower IOR rate, ei-
ther of which would reduce borrowing rates for all borrowers without
rent capture by banks.
In the FedAccount system, it becomes natural to see bank char-
ters through the lens of outsourcing or procurement. Member banks
appear as instrumentalities or franchisees of the state rather than as
private "intermediaries."180 Procurement implies discretionary selec-
tion; free entry is nonsensical in a procurement setting. The central
bank would select the "best" managers according to established crite-
ria. Discretionary selection might initially seem foreign to banking,
but it has a long pedigree. U.S. federal bank regulators traditionally
looked to "the convenience and needs of the community" in passing
on bank charter applications,181 rejecting even qualified applicants on
178 See, e.g., Credit Subsidy Estimates for the Sections 7(a) and 504 Business Loan Programs
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 105th Cong. 48 (1997) (statement of Judy A. En-
gland-Joseph, Dir., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Issues, U.S. Gen. AccEt. Off.).
179 See generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: How INVISIBLE GOVERN-
MENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7 (2011) (arguing against "hidden
form[s]" of government that "channel[] public resources predominately to wealthy Americans
and privileged industries").
180 Cf Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 1143, 1145, 1144-67 (2017) (challenging the view of banks as intermediaries between "pri-
vately-owned funds" and "other private ... actors"). Doctrinally, national banks are already
classified as federal instrumentalities. For a discussion of the relevant case law, see BARADARAN,
supra note 21, at 1290-92.
181 See Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Star. 684, 688; Bureau of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-13, 177A-14 (Sept. 11, 1946). The statutory
provision was deleted in 1991. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 115, 105 Star. 2236, 2249.
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this basis.182 In this respect, bank regulation borrowed from an older
tradition in public utility and common carrier regulation, where regu-
lators have long required prospective providers to receive certificates
of "public convenience and necessity" before commencing service.183
The modern economic literature treats this regulatory technique as
discretionary procurement,184  a well-established administrative
function.185
Finally, should it choose to outsource some portion of its portfo-
lio allocation to member banks, the Fed will have to deal with incen-
tive problems, namely moral hazard. Incentive problems afflict all
agency relationships186 and moral hazard is endemic to insurance
markets. Traditional U.S. bank regulation uses standard private-sector
techniques for combating moral hazard, including portfolio con-
straints to limit risk-taking, equity capital requirements to absorb
"first loss," and risk-based fees.187 Hence FedAccount would not re-
quire any significant changes to the substantive contours of prudential
bank regulation.
B. Shortcomings of Other CBDC Designs
This Article has described FedAccount as a type of CBDC-a
digital currency issued by the central bank. CBDC has emerged as a
front-burner topic at the world's major central banks, but the ongoing
discussions rest on questionable design assumptions which, if adopted,
would undermine the transformative potential of CBDC.
182 See Kenneth E. Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Bank-
ing Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 284-85 (1975).
183 See, e.g., Transportation Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78 (em-
powering the I.C.C. to control railroad entry and exit by issuing certificates of public conve-
nience and necessity); William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 426 (1979) (describing
the origins of "[t]he certificate of public convenience and necessity"); see also Morgan Ricks,
Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 757, 769 (describing "a close kinship" be-
tween "bank regulation and infrastructure regulation" sharing features including "entry restric-
tion ... based on public convenience and necessity").
184 See JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CON-
TRACTS, AND DISCRETION 3 (2003) (describing infrastructure regulation as "particularly analo-
gous to contracting in private sector procurement"); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11
J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (1968) (analyzing utility regulation from the perspective of franchise
bidding).
185 See, e.g., Government Procurement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://
ustr.gov/issue-areas/government-procurement [ht ps://perma.cc/B4D2-RMN7].
186 See RICKS, supra note 103, at 204.
187 Id. at 204-12.
[Vol. 89:113
FEDACCOUNTS: DIGITAL DOLLARS
Scholarly and policy discussions to date have focused heavily on a
supposedly crucial distinction between "token-based" and "account-
based" CBDC designs.188 Token-based designs are understood to
mimic features of physical currency, whereas account-based designs
are thought to be more like traditional bank accounts.189 Token-based
designs purportedly offer three main advantages over account-based
designs: greater peer-to-peer functionality, greater anonymity, and
lower fraud protection and other customer service demands.190 Ana-
lysts typically associate token-based designs with distributed ledger
technology, such as the blockchain technology that undergirds Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies.191
Although the token- versus account-based distinction may seem
intuitive at first blush, it breaks down under examination. Distributed
ledgers are still ledgers in which transactions must be recorded; they
are fundamentally different from physical currency in this respect.
Physical currency payments are literally peer-to-peer in the sense that
they do not involve any third-party communications at all. Not so for
digital currency transactions. Bitcoin payments are executed by trans-
mitting messages to the entire Bitcoin network, where transaction
records are permanently maintained.192 These messages travel over
existing telecommunications rails, and transfers are processed through
automated protocols for debits and credits.193 This is not dissimilar
from electronic payments between bank accounts or between ac-
counts at money services businesses like Venmo.194 The physicalized
imagery of "tokens" transferred between digital "wallets" is therefore
rather misleading: ledgers, distributed or otherwise, are for keeping
count, and one might as well call the ledger entries "accounts."
188 COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12, at 4.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 6 (peer-to-peer transfer and anonymity); Brunnermeier et al., supra note 5, at
4-5 (describing account-based money in terms of banks' obligations to verify identity and their
responsibility for customer refunds).
191 See, e.g., John Barrdear & Michael Kumhof, The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Is-
sued Digital Currencies 5 (Bank of Eng., Staff Working Paper No. 605, 2016) (defining "'digital
currency' as any electronic form of money, or medium of exchange, that features a distributed
ledger and a decentralised payment system"); Carstens, supra note 8, at 3 (also identifying to-
ken-based digital currency with distributed ledger technology).
192 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1 (2009),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQG5-269R].
193 See id.
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As for anonymity, there is nothing inherent in distributed ledger
technology that allows for more anonymity than account-based sys-
tems can provide. Anonymity is not a technological question but a
policy question. Decentralized ledgers can be either permissioned or
permissionless;195 the same goes for centralized ledgers. There would
be no technological impediment to letting people open bank accounts
anonymously or pseudonymously. That society has chosen to forbid
this as a public policy matter casts doubt on the wisdom of promoting
absolute anonymity as a desirable CBDC feature. Discomfort with an-
onymity in central bank accounts should apply equally to anonymity
in digital "wallets" containing CBDC "tokens." This Article questions
whether facilitating greater anonymity in dollar-based payments
should be among the Fed's policy objectives.196 Regulatory policy has
moved strongly in the opposite direction in recent decades for law
enforcement and national security reasons.197 People seeking pure an-
onymity can use other transaction means, such as physical currency,
anonymous private cryptocurrencies, or precious metals-based ex-
change or other forms of barter. Perhaps fully anonymous payment
systems should be left largely to "the market."198
The third way token-based CBDC designs purportedly mimic
physical currency is that they do not impose ongoing fraud protection
or other customer-service demands on the issuer. Once the central
bank releases physical currency into circulation, the central bank is no
longer involved in transfers and offers no recourse to victims of fraud
or theft. Some analysts apparently envision token-based CBDCs
working the same way.199 A recent paper by three leading economists
notes that what really distinguishes token-based from account-based
digital currencies is that token-based currencies do not offer protec-
tion against unauthorized payment, whereas in account-based systems
the intermediary assumes liability and refunds the account holder.200
Although U.S. bank accounts offer such protections, this again is a
195 See Toshendra Kumar Sharma, Permissioned and Permissionless Blockchains: A Com-
prehensive Guide, BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.blockchain-council.org/
blockchain/permissioned-and-permissionless-blockchains-a-comprehensive-guide/ [https://
perma.cc/M26Y-WE7K].
196 See Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 104 ("[N]o reputable central bank would issue
a decentralized virtual currency where users can remain anonymous.").
197 See infra Section IV.B.
198 See Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 104 ("We believe that [the demand for anony-
mous payments] can and will be perfectly satisfied by the private sector, in particular through
[private] cryptocurrencies.").
199 See, e.g., COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12, at 4.
200 See Brunnermeier et al., supra note 5, at 5.
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policy (and in some cases a business) choice rather than an attribute
of the underlying technology. U.S. law requires banks to make cus-
tomers whole for unauthorized transfers in most circumstances.201
There is nothing about a centralized ledger that makes protection
against fraud or theft obligatory, just as there is nothing about decen-
tralized ledger technology that would somehow prevent the central
bank from offering such protection for token-based CBDC. More
generally, this Article questions the apparent desire to replicate in
CBDC the rampant fraudulent activity and security failures that have
plagued the cryptocurrency space.20 2
If distributed ledger technology offers no inherent technological
advantages over traditional centralized ledgers, it is hard to see any
reason to favor token-based over account-based CBDC designs. Much
of the excitement about distributed ledgers arises from distrust of gov-
ernment and central intermediaries.23 But CBDC involves the central
bank, by definition.20 4 Besides, distributed ledgers in their current
forms are painfully slow and costly compared with centralized systems
like Fedwire.205 For these reasons, there is no compelling basis for bas-
ing CBDC on distributed ledger technology.
201 See MATTHEWS & NICKLES, supra note 42, at 213 ("[I]n case[s] of check fraud ... the
loss [usually] falls on the payor bank .... "); id. at 383 (issuing bank typically bears liability for
unauthorized use of credit card); id. at 420 (bank usually bears liability for unauthorized com-
mercial funds transfers); id. at 447 (same for unauthorized consumer funds transfers).
202 See, e.g., Billy Bambrough, Researchers Have Issued a Serious Bitcoin Security Warning,
FORBES (Sept. 12, 2019, 8:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2019/09/12/re-
searchers-have-issued-a-serious-bitcoin-qr-code-warning/?sh=57027b036d12 [https://perma.cc/
U498-V3VL].
203 See Andrew Szmurlo, Linda Wu & Samantha Eyler-Driscoll, Does the Growth of
Bitcoin Have Anything to Do with Distrust of Government?, PROMARKET (Feb. 21, 2018), https://
promarket.org/2018/02/21/growth-bitcoin-anything-distrust-government/ [https://perma.cc/
UTM9-GJ34].
204 Incidentally, despite the rhetoric about decentralization and disintermediation, millions
who hold cryptocurrencies today do use central intermediaries to store these assets. See, e.g.,
Brian Fung, Move Deliberately, Fix Things: How Coinbase Is Building a Cryptocurrency Empire,
WASH. POST (May 17, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
move-deliberately-fix-things-how-coinbase-is-building-a-cryptocurrency-empire/2018/05/17/
623d950c-587c-11e8-858f-12becb4d6067_story.html [https://perma.cc/B7LR-AVFJ] (describing
Coinbase's role as a major cryptocurrency intermediary). For a typically mordant take on this
issue, see Matt Levine, Taking the Gold out of Goldman Sachs, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:01
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-06/taking-the-gold-out-of-goldman-
sachs [https://perma.cc/359A-YRMS] (observing of the clients of crypto exchange Quadriga CX,
who lost their Bitcoin when Quadriga's founder (ostensibly) died without having provided any-
one else access to the private keys to the company's digital wallets: "If you are a believer in the
power of cryptocurrency, if you like its promise of trustless decentralized money, why did you
entrust millions of dollars of your money to one guy with a laptop?").
205 See, e.g., Ed Lin, Bitcoin Can't Take a Bite Out of Visa, Mastercard, BARRON'S (Mar. 28,
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The preoccupation with "tokens" versus "accounts" has dis-
tracted CBDC analysts from the crucial issue: whether CBDC will be
integrated with or segregated from the broader system of money and
payments. In an integrated system, dollars would be fungible between
existing bank accounts and CBDC accounts. Balances could be trans-
ferred seamlessly between such accounts; in other words, payments
could be made or received directly between a CBDC account and an
ordinary bank account. In a segregated system, by contrast, the CBDC
system would be walled off from the existing system of money and
payments. It would be an internal, closed system. Both parties to a
CBDC transaction would need to have opted into CBDC digital
wallets.
Although FedAccount would be an integrated system-central
bank accounts are already central to the mainstream payment sys-
tem-most of the CBDC literature to date envisions a segregated sys-
tem design.20 6 The stakes in this design choice are enormous. A
segregated CBDC would further balkanize our system of money and
payments and limit CBDC uptake, with no countervailing upside. Part
of the preference for segregation may stem from a desire to forestall
large-scale migration out of the existing banking system to CBDC.
But if the CBDC system is segregated, any effort to limit its size in the
face of high demand would make it difficult or impossible for the Fed
to maintain par convertibility between CBDC and the dollar, risking
the emergence of an altogether new currency denomination.27 More-
2018, 9:22 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/bitcoin-cant-take-a-bite-out-of-visa-master-
card-1522238401 [https://perma.cc/FH3Q-P5T2] (citing an analyst's report that "Visa can process
65,000 transaction messages per second, at full capacity, compared with fewer than 10 bitcoin
transactions per second"); Kenneth Rapoza, Here's One Reason Why Bitcoin Is in Freefall,
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/02/02/heres-one-
reason-why-bitcoin-is-in-freefall/?sh=10c5260567c8 [https://perma.cc/73RQ-6D7U] ("[I]n an odd
twist, the North American Bitcoin Conference stopped accepting Bitcoin payments for tickets
due to transaction fees and slow processing times for payment .... "); see also Anna Irrera &
John McCrank, Wall Street Rethinks Blockchain Projects as Euphoria Meets Reality, REUTERS
(Mar. 27, 2018, 12:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-fintech-blockchain/wall-
street-rethinks-blockchain-projects-as-eupho-ria-meets-reality-idUSKBNIH32GO [https://
perma.cc/DLM7-VDJ9] (describing large financial institutions "shelv[ing]" blockchain projects
after realizing they can achieve the same benefits more cheaply with preexisting technology).
206 E.g., Raphael Auer & Rainer B6hme, The Technology of Retail Central Bank Digital
Currency, BIS OR., March 2020, at 85, 90-91 (describing a CBDC system where cryptocurrency
payments are "segregated from the balance sheets of the payments service providers"). A token-
based system would necessarily be segregated because distributed ledger technology is not inter-
operable with the existing account-based payment system.
207 See, e.g., J.P. KONING, R3, FEDCOIN: A CENTRAL BANK-ISSUED CRYPTOCURRENCY 6-8
(2016) (describing a fixed currency peg and convertibility for Fedcoin, a proposed central bank
cryptocurrency); Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 103 ("To ensure parity between a crypto
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over, the concern about overmigration is unwarranted in the first
place.208 FedAccount's transformational benefits described in Part II
depend on large-scale migration. They also depend on integration and
seamless interoperability with the existing, mainstream system of
money and payments. Segregation would undermine all these
benefits.
The Fed and other central banks should keep it simple. CBDC
does not require new technologies.209 It merely requires expanding ac-
cess to a desirable, proven product that the Fed already offers-bank
accounts at the central bank.2 10 The existing CBDC literature has
tended to overcomplicate and mystify a topic that should be straight-
forward. Physical currency is already an open-access resource, and
central bank accounts can be as well.
C. Relation to Other Reform Proposals
This Section addresses narrow banking and postal banking pro-
posals, whose features and motivations overlap with FedAccount. In-
sofar as they do overlap, FedAccount offers better solutions and more
comprehensive benefits.
1. Narrow Banking
Narrow banking proposals aim to stabilize banking by restricting
bank asset portfolios to super-safe assets.211 In the original and purest
narrow banking proposal-called full-reserve banking or the Chicago
Plan2 2-deposit banks would own nothing but base money: currency
and central bank balances.213 Full-reserve banks would be cash ware-
houses.2 14 Modern narrow banking variants would give deposit banks
fiat unit and central bank reserves, the central bank must be willing to buy and sell any number
of these tokens at par.").
208 See supra Section IILA.
209 E.g., supra Part I, Section II.E.
210 See supra note 10.
211 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking as a Structural Remedy for the Problem of
Systemic Risk: A Comment on Professor Schwarcz's Ring-Fencing, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. POST-
SCRIPT 1, 1-2 (2014).
212 See generally RONNIE J. PHILLIPS, THE CHICAGO PLAN & NEw DEAL BANKING RE-
FORM (1995).
213 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability 70 (1959) (proposing a
"100% reserves" system like the Chicago Plan); IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY 9-10 (1935) (ad-
vancing a proposal that would require banks to permanently have "a cash reserve of 100%
against its demand deposits"); HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 40,
62, 64 (1948) (describing a similar plan); Levitin, supra note 177, at 414 (discussing "[h]istorical
100% reserve-banking proposals").
214 FISHER, supra note 213, at 10.
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slightly broader investment powers, allowing them to invest in ex-
tremely safe securities like Treasury bills.215
There is a sense in which FedAccounts, if broadly adopted, would
modernize the original Chicago Plan by cutting out the middlemen.2 16
Rather than holding accounts at full-reserve banks-pass-through ve-
hicles for base money-people and businesses would just hold their
accounts directly with the central bank. Economically, these ap-
proaches amount to the same thing. As noted in Part I, today's in-
creasingly paperless money-and-payment system means that an
extensive brick-and-mortar banking presence is no longer required to
service payments.217 The Chicago Plan's stability objectives can thus
be achieved without any full-reserve "banks."
In another sense, though, FedAccount flips the original Chicago
Plan on its head. In the original Chicago Plan, all money was base
money, but the central bank outsourced to full-reserve banks the man-
agement of account balances218-the right side of the central bank's
balance sheet. In FedAccount, this right-side function is not out-
sourced, but the central bank may choose to outsource at least a por-
tion of its left-side (investment) function.2 19 For the reasons stated
above, there is a reasonable case for at least some left-side outsourc-
ing, whereas right-side outsourcing is not only needless but
counterproductive.
Figure 2 compares FedAccount to the Chicago Plan. Under the
Chicago Plan, private banks would be warehouses or pass-through ve-
215 See, e.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD'S
ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING 6 (2010) (describing Limited
Purpose Banking and proposing that "[a] single federal regulator . . . [should] supervise the
custody and independent rating of all securities held by all mutual funds"); see also LITAN, supra
note 168, at 23 (describing early government efforts to constrain banks to carefully selected
securities); Gary Gorton & Andrew Merrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOK-
INGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 284-87 (proposing a narrow bank regulatory
model for the shadow banking system). A former Fed official has recently attempted to launch a
narrow bank, TNB USA, Inc., that would serve institutional investors seeking to park large cash
balances, though the Fed has so far resisted his efforts. See John Crawford, Making Money Safe,
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 1, 1-3 (2019) (critiquing the Fed's rationale for resisting
TNB's efforts).
216 Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar draw a similar analogy to the Chicago Plan in
their discussion of central bank digital currencies. Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 103.
217 See, e.g., Telis Demos, Citigroup to Again Be a Nationwide Bank, but in Digital Form,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2018, 7:00 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-to-again-be-a-na-
tionwide-bank-but-in-digital-form-1521975601 [https://perma.cc/3Q3S-K62Q] (describing Ci-
tigroup's plan "to pitch an entirely mobile relationship to a wide swath of consumers under its
primary brand name").
218 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
219 See supra Section IILA.
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hicles for base money.2 20 They would supply accounts and transaction
services to the public. The central bank's portfolio composition under
the Chicago Plan is an open question. Under FedAccount, the central
bank would serve directly as account manager and transaction proces-
sor for the general public. Member banks, if any, would be portfolio
allocators for the central bank but (assuming full migration) would
not maintain customer accounts.
FIGURE 2. CHICAGO PLAN VERSUs FEDACCOUNT
Chicago Plan
Central Bank Full-Reserve Banks
- Base money Accounts -
- Base money Accounts -*
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2. Postal Banking
Postal banking proposals would enlist the facilities, personnel,
and civic mandate of the U.S. Postal Service to provide some financial
services to those whose needs are not met by banks.2 21 The postal sys-
tem boasts ubiquity, particularly in towns and neighborhoods where
bank branches are closing.222 Postal banking is well established in
other countries223 and has historical precedent in the United States.2 24
The U.S. Postal Service already offers a handful of financial ser-
vices, such as money orders.225 Postal banking proposals would aug-
ment these services to include provision of prepaid, reloadable debit
cards, savings account products,2 2 6 and small-dollar loans.2 2 7 The pos-
tal service would likely partner with one or more banks to provide
these services.2 28 Contrary to widespread belief, prepaid cards are
bank products. They are linked to pooled bank accounts run by the
card program managers and operate on standard bank-based payment
rails.229
FedAccount and postal banking are philosophically harmonious.
Both emphasize financial inclusion and champion direct public provi-
sioning, though FedAccount can be viewed as more public because it
221 See Postal Banking Act, S. 2755, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing an amendment o Title
39 that would allow the U.S. Postal Service to provide basic financial services); BARADARAN,
supra note 21, at 187-92, 197-205; OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SERV., RARC-WP-14-
007, PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED 1 (2014) [hereinafter
2014 White Paper]; OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SERV., RARC-WP-15-011, THE ROAD
AHEAD FOR POSTAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Report].
222 See 2014 White Paper, supra note 221, at i-ii; Kevin Wack, When a Small Town Loses Its
Only Bank, AM. BANKER (Feb. 2, 2020, 9:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/when-
a-small-town-loses-its-only-bank [https://perma.cc/4E2J-HUJY].
223 See 2014 White Paper, supra note 221, at 25.
224 See id. at 22.
225 See id. at ii.
226 S. 2755 § 2 (capping permissible postal savings accounts at the larger of (1) $20,000 or
(2) "25 percent of the median ... balance" in all U.S. bank accounts).
227 See id. (authorizing the post office to provide "low-cost, small-dollar loans, not to ex-
ceed $500 at a time, or $1,000 from 1 year of the issuance of the initial loan").
228 While the proposed Postal Banking Act rules out a USPS bank charter, it states the post
office may offer savings and checking accounts "alone, or in partnership with depository institu-
tions." Id. §§ 2, 5. The postal service's own documents, however, lean toward a partnership with
private banks. See 2014 White Paper, supra note 221, at 9, 18; 2015 Report, supra note 221, at 27.
229 See Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 83,934, 83,937, 83,939-40 (Nov. 22, 2016) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1005, 1026) (describing the mechanics of prepaid card programs
drawing on underlying pooled bank accounts); Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value
Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,155, 67,156-57 (Nov. 13,
2008) (referring to prepaid cards as "access mechanisms" for the underlying accounts).
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does not rely on private sector banks to manage accounts. Postal
banking is a worthy policy measure-but when it comes to money and
payments, FedAccount is far better. Postal banking does not offer the
myriad transformative benefits (apart from inclusion) described
above: financial stability, payment speed and efficiency, monetary pol-
icy transmission, eliminating transaction tolls, seigniorage recapture,
and regulatory streamlining. Further, the cost burden on the postal
service would be substantial because it would service small accounts
only. By contrast, because FedAccount would attract large accounts in
addition to small ones, system revenues would be substantial, likely
covering system costs easily.2 30 Finally, as noted in Part I, FedAccount
could very well make use of postal facilities to host ATMs and possi-
bly branch-type services. FedAccount could therefore be branded as
postal banking; but this is just labeling. If postal banking is to be im-
plemented through a back-end bank, that bank might as well be the
public's bank.
Unlike most postal banking proposals,2 31 FedAccount does not
have a direct consumer lending component. Postal banking would fo-
cus on small dollar amounts-sums too small for a bank to lend di-
rectly to even the most creditworthy of customers. Direct consumer
lending helps prevent those with short-term liquidity crises from turn-
ing to payday lenders, pawnshop operators, or loan sharks.232 FedAc-
count would ameliorate this problem to some degree, because
liquidity crises for those living paycheck to paycheck often arise from,
or are exacerbated by, slow payment processing.233 Moreover, FedAc-
count would increase savings rates among currently un- and un-
derbanked households. But FedAccount, in and of itself, admittedly is
not a robust response to these households' credit needs.
That said, FedAccount contemplates a large central bank balance
sheet, which carries with it the possibility of channeling credit to
achieve specified social ends. One could imagine a dedicated portfolio
allocation to small-dollar consumer lending. This Article has reserva-
tions about putting government agencies, whether the Fed or the pos-
tal service, in the small-dollar debt collection business. As described
above, there are strong reasons for outsourcing individualized portfo-
230 See supra Section I.G.
231 E.g., supra text accompanying notes 226-27.
232 Cf 2014 White Paper, supra note 221, at i (noting that underserved Americans "use
costly services like payday loans and check cashing exchanges" because they are not effectively
served "by the traditional financial sector").
233 See supra Section I.G.
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lio allocation decisions in lending markets to member banks.34 But
outsourcing need not imply complete loss of control. The central bank
can readily condition bank membership on compliance with credit dis-
tribution requirements. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977235
does this today, requiring insured banks to take demonstrable mea-
sures to meet the credit needs of their entire communities.236 FedAc-
count is not a consumer lending program, but it is compatible with
such programs; indeed, small-dollar lending through the post office
could easily coexist with FedAccount.
Operationally, money and payments are quite different from
lending. Money and payments are processing-intensive and raise dis-
tinctive network-type issues involving interconnection and network
externalities.237 They have infrastructural characteristics not present in
lending markets. Lending involves more individualized, context-spe-
cific analysis. These two activities are quite different, and they should
be treated separately in policy analysis.
IV. COSTS AND OBJECTIONS
This Section addresses potential objections to and costs of
FedAccount. The costs do not outweigh the massive benefits de-
scribed above.
A. Institutional Competence
Some may question whether the Fed, or for that matter any gov-
ernmental organ, has the institutional competence to manage a system
like FedAccount. This Article does not share these qualms. FedAc-
count is a system for payments and accounts: a ledger combined with
processes and protocols for debiting and crediting balances. The Fed
already does this very efficiently on a huge scale. Today, it maintains
account liabilities totaling about $4.8 trillion.238 As a point of compari-
son, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo have total
deposit liabilities of $2.0 trillion, $1.7 trillion, and $1.4 trillion, respec-
tively.239 The Fed has vast and longstanding expertise in transaction
234 See supra Section IILA.
235 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908.
236 Id.; 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 195, 228, 345.
237 See supra Sections IIB, II.E.
238 See FED. RSRV., STATISTICAL RELEASE: FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE BALANCES OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITION STATEMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS para. 5
(Nov. 12, 2020).
239 See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., EARNINGS RELEASE FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT: THIRD
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processing.2 40 FedAccount would involve scaling up these existing
functions.
Admittedly, the Fed does not have experience in retail opera-
tions. It would need to build a user-friendly web portal and a mobile
phone application for FedAccount holders, as well as a customer ser-
vice department. Retail operations would also present challenges in
the areas of law enforcement and counterterrorism as well as cyber-
security and fraud prevention.2 4 1 Building this retail infrastructure
would be challenging, but thousands of banks have done it success-
fully. And all sorts of governmental entities already interface directly
with the public. Notably, the U. S. Treasury Department processes
over one billion payments per year and disburses benefits to millions
of Social Security and pension recipients each month.242 The U.S.
Treasury Department also settles claims resulting from forged, lost,
and stolen benefit checks and collects monies from parties liable for
fraud.2 43 Following the botched roll out of healthcare.gov, the Execu-
tive Office of the President set up the U.S. Digital Service ("USDS"),
which recruits top technologists for term-limited tours of duty in the
federal government.244 USDS has dramatically improved direct ser-
vices in areas ranging from the Education Department's $1 trillion
student loan program to the Department of Homeland Security's im-
migration program.245
Finally, by improving the pass-through of the Fed's interest rate
adjustments and reducing the size and complexity of large financial
institutions,2 46 FedAccount would bolster the Fed's ability to compe-
tently carry out its other core duties.
QUARTER 2020, at 3 (2020); BANK OF AM., SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: THIRD QUARTER
2020, at 5 (2020); WELLS FARGO, 3020 QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT 7 (2020).
240 See FED. RSRV. Sys., supra note 134, at 118-151.
241 See supra Sections IIB, II.C.
242 See FED. RSRV. Sys., supra note 134, at 122-29.
243 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., CONGRESSIONAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT AND PLAN: FY
2018, at 18-19 (2017).
244 Jessie Bur, Inside the Agency Where You Wish You Worked, FED. TIMES (July 25, 2018),
https://www.federaltimes.com/it-networks/2018/07/25/inside-the-agency-where-you-wish-you-
worked/ [https://perma.cc/PF45-URL5].
245 See U.S. DIGIT. SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS 3, 10, 28 (2017).
246 See supra Sections IID, II.F.
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B. Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,247 as amended by the USA PA-
TRIOT Act,248 requires financial institutions to assist the government
in preventing money laundering, countering terrorist financing, and
addressing other suspicious financial activity.249 The Secretary of the
Treasury, acting through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN"), administers these laws and has promulgated rules re-
quiring banks to file currency transaction reports for transactions ex-
ceeding $10,000 and suspicious activity reports for behavior suggesting
money laundering, tax evasion, or other illicit activity.250 Banks must
also conduct customer due diligence before opening new bank
accounts.25 '
Technically speaking, the Fed is not subject to these rules and
requirements,25 2 but FedAccounts should nonetheless fully comply.25 3
The Fed is already intimately familiar with these rules because it helps
enforce them for the banks it regulates.25 4 Although the Fed would
initially hire an external service provider to conduct customer identifi-
cation reviews and customer due diligence, over time it presumably
would build its own "know your customer" ("KYC") utility to handle
Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering ("BSA/AML") compliance.
This utility could also double as a service to other banks and financial
firms,25 5 and the resulting fees could offset some or all of FedAc-
counts' compliance costs. Although BSA/AML compliance will likely
247 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
248 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit III, 115
Stat. 272, 296.
249 Id.; 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
250 See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2019) (filing obligations for reports of transactions in cur-
rency); id. § 1010.320 (reports of suspicious transactions).
251 See id. § 1020.220.
252 See id. § 1010.605(e) (defining "covered financial institution").
253 See Berentsen & Schar, supra note 17, at 104 (noting that failure to comply would un-
dermine the policy motivating these requirements for commercial banks).
254 See Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics: Enforcement, BD. GOVERNORS FED.
RSRV. (AUG. 13, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/enforcement.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ZUQ-DUDL].
255 See THE CLEARING HOUSE, A NEW PARADIGM: REDESIGNING THE U.S. AML/CFT
FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY AND AID LAW ENFORCEMENT 19 (2017) (rec-
ommending "[a]n AML/sanctions utility [to] facilitate the bulk screening of transactions" to be
run by a government agency or a private sector consortium); id. at 5 (explaining that "[f]inancial
institutions devote vast resources to activities that could easily be performed centrally by govern-




be one of the biggest FedAccount expenses (alongside fraud protec-
tion and cybersecurity), FedAccount will likely result in a net reduc-
tion of BSA/AML compliance expenditures for the financial sector as
a whole,25 6 owing to economies of scale and reductions in duplicative
AML reviews.257
C. Cybersecurity and Fraud Prevention
Cybersecurity and fraud prevention for FedAccounts would place
a significant new burden on the Fed. Criminals, fraudsters, and oppor-
tunistic hackers will likely target FedAccounts just as they target ex-
isting retail banks and payment networks.25 8 The Fed already runs a
highly secure information technology system with expert cyber-de-
fense capabilities at the system level.25 9 But even the most robust pe-
rimeter security would not stop customers from compromising their
individual accounts-misdirecting funds, losing their passwords, or
falling prey to malicious actors.2 60 Although the Fed has made sub-
stantial strides in improving its fraud detection systems in the wake of
cles/a-new-aml-system [https://perma.cc/U5LT-XHFF] (outlining the need for more centralized
information sharing).
256 The expenditures are large. See Emma Dunkley, Vetting Clients is a Complex Problem
for Banks, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9b18d648-4ff5-11e6-8172-
e39ecd3b86fc [https://perma.cc/GMW8-ZHKU] (noting that some large financial institutions
spend up to $500 million per year on KYC); Tim Lloyd, 2017 AML Year in Review, ABA BANK-
ING J. (Feb. 1 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/02/2017-aml-year-in-review/ [https://
perma.cc/E7X2-ZMMR] (noting that AML spending by U.S. firms is estimated to reach $8 bil-
lion per year).
257 Numerous checks are typically performed today when people move money between
accounts at different financial institutions. Eighty percent of AML compliance cost is dedicated
to information gathering and processing, tasks that are performed for the same customers over
and over again by different institutions. See EAMONN MAGUIRE, DAVID HICKS, WEI KEAT NG,
TEK YEW CHIA & STEPHEN MARSHALL, KPMG, COULD BLOCKCHAIN BE THE FOUNDATION OF
A VIABLE KYC UTILITY? 2 (2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/03/kpmg-
blockchain-kyc-utility.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP6M-LEV8].
258 See Timeline of Cyber Incidents Involving Financial Institutions, CARNEGIE ENDOW-
MENT FOR INT'L PEACE, https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/protectingfinancial-
stability/timeline [https://perma.cc/6N88-JXF7].
259 See Shane Harris, Exclusive: Meet the Fed's First Line of Defense against Cyber Attacks,
FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 29, 2014, 12:24 A.M.), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/29/exclusive-
meet-the-feds-first-line-of-defense-against-cyber-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/CRU4-AH9U]
(describing the National Incident Response Team, the Fed's "crack cyber security unit"). Fur-
thermore, the Treasury auction process now includes many bidders and transacts trillions of dol-
lars per year. See Treasury Auctions, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed41.html [https://perma.cc/U6J5-PLD2].
260 See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Zelle, the Banks' Answer to Venmo, Proves Vulnerable to Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/business/zelle-banks-fraud.html
[https://perma.cc/EW4N-3R3B].
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the Bangladesh Bank Heist,26' it would have to make a major invest-
ment in cybersecurity to run FedAccount properly.
Such an effort is not as far from the government's core compe-
tence as it might seem. Not only does the Fed already have experience
protecting its existing payments systems,2 62 but other executive branch
departments have taken an increasingly large role in helping retail
banks protect their own systems.2 63 The Fed could turn to the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security or third-party contractors to en-
sure that its account security system is state of the art. Of course, the
Fed would not succeed in detecting or preventing all fraud, but the
Fed could insure consumer losses from cybertheft, just as private
banks do now.264
D. Privacy and Civil Liberties
Managing citizens' bank accounts implicates their privacy and
civil liberties. There is a risk that governmental actors could abuse the
information or inadvertently or deliberately share it with third parties.
Although these concerns are legitimate, some perspective is in order
for four reasons.
First, the degree to which existing bank accounts are "private"
should not be overstated. The Fourth Amendment does not protect
information contained in bank records.265 Federal statutory law does
261 Hackers attempted to transfer up to $1 billion from Bangladesh Bank's account in the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to accounts in the Philippines. See Devlin Barrett & Katy
Burne, FBI Investigating Bangladesh Bank-Account Heist, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2016, 11:11
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-investigating-bangladesh-bank-account-heist-1458313232
[https://perma.cc/3HKA-QS3V]; Fed Develops New Fraud Prevention Model, CENT. BANKING
(June 19, 2020), https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/financial-market-infrastructure/
7564751/fed-develops-new-fraud-prevention-model [https://perma.cc/28K6-8DVT].
262 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
263 For example, the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee pro-
motes public-private partnerships "to improve the reliability and security of the financial sector
infrastructure." Mission and History, FIN. & BANKING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE COMM., https://
www.fbiic.gov/mission-history.html [https://perma.cc/SJ6G-4W63]; see also Press Release, Fed.
Rsrv., Fed Prepares for Next Phase of Payments Security Effort as Secure Payments Task Force
Concludes (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
other20180301a.htm [https://perma.cc/Q4QE-R4LX] (describing past and planned future collab-
orative efforts with industry).
264 See Robert K. Knake, No, the FDIC Doesn't Insure Your Bank Account Against Cyber-
crime (and Why That Is OK), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/
blog/no-fdic-doesnt-insure-your-bank-account-against-cybercrime-and-why-ok#: :text=con-
trary%20to %20what%20many%20people,private %20insurance %20for%20fraud%201oss
[https://perma.cc/DA57-BHVD] ("[M]ost banks have private insurance for fraud loss.").
265 This is the "third-party doctrine." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976)
(holding that financial records given to a third-party financial institution receive no Fourth
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provide some basic privacy coverage for financial records, including
bank accounts: the Right to Financial Privacy Act 266 affords procedu-
ral protections to individuals (but not businesses) when law enforce-
ment agencies seek bank records,267 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act 2 68 requires financial institutions to safeguard sensitive customer
information.269 But Congress has chosen over time to balance these
privacy concerns with other priorities, especially crime prevention and
national security. For instance, BSA/AML compliance by banks re-
quires extensive reporting to the government of qualifying financial
transactions.270 FinCEN's database of currency transaction reports and
suspicious activity reports contains hundreds of millions of entries,
and law enforcement agencies and government investigative bodies
search it many hundreds of times daily.271
Second, federal government agencies are not exempt from pri-
vacy law and policy-far from it. It is a fact of modern life that certain
federal government agencies possess sensitive information pertaining
to individuals, such as health records and financial records. The Fed is
already subject to the Privacy Act of 1974,272 the "grandfather of fed-
eral privacy," 273 which requires government agencies to protect data
they possess on individuals.274 The Act includes procedural constraints
on law enforcement access275 and requires agencies to establish safe-
Amendment protection). Also, bank accounts can be garnished or levied by creditors, including
federal government agencies acting in their creditor capacities. See Garnishing Federal Benefits,
FED. TRADE COMM'N (May 2009), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0114-garnishing-fed-
eral-benefits [https://perma.cc/AHK6-J9RK] (describing federal benefits that can be garnished
from a bank account by creditors). FedAccounts would be no more readily garnishable than
commercial bank accounts.
266 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422.
267 Id.
268 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Star. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
269 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809.
270 See supra Section IV.B.
271 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-574, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING OP-
PORTUNITIES EXIST TO INCREASE LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF BANK SECRECY Acr REPORTS,
AND BANKS' COSTS TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT VARIED (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/
709547.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2KY-TREY] ("As of December 2018, GAO found that the Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) granted the majority of federal and state law en-
forcement agencies and some local agencies direct access to its BSA database, allowing them to
conduct searches to find relevant BSA reports. FinCEN data show that these agencies searched
the BSA database for about 133,000 cases in 2018 .... ").
272 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 12 C.F.R. § 261a (2020).
273 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclo-
sure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV.
485, 499 (2013).
274 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
275 See id. § 552a(b)(7).
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guards to ensure data security and confidentiality.2 76 The Fed also uses
"Privacy Impact Assessments," as mandated by the E-Government
Act of 2002,277 to help ensure privacy issues are prioritized when sys-
tems containing individuals' data are established or overhauled.2 78
And the Office of Management and Budget requires all federal
agency employees with access to systems that include personally iden-
tifiable information to undergo initial training on privacy duties, with
annual refreshers thereafter.279
Third, more stringent privacy protection can be brought to bear if
desired. A highly pertinent example here is the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS"). For many individuals and businesses, tax records are
much more extensive and sensitive than bank records. Although the
IRS has not been entirely free from controversy in recent years,28 0 it
has largely been beyond reproach in protecting taxpayers' private in-
formation. Tax returns and the information they contain are confiden-
tial,28i and "federal income tax records are among the most protected
pieces of personal information; laws strictly circumscribe law enforce-
ment access to tax records."28 2 The IRS has adopted comprehensive
policies and procedures to protect private data28 3 and invests heavily
in compliance.284 Data access is carefully limited and tracked within
the agency 285 Unauthorized disclosure and even inspection are crimi-
276 See id. § 552a(e)(10).
277 Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
278 Id. § 208, 44 U.S.C. § 3501.
279 See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Off. of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Off. Of the President, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts. & Agencies 5 (May 22, 2007).
280 See, e.g., Peter Overby, IRS Apologizes for Aggressive Scrutiny of Conservative Groups,
NPR (Oct. 27, 2017, 3:08 P.M.), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/27/560308997/irs-apologizes-for-ag-
gressive-scrutiny-of-conservative-groups [https://perma.cc/N3QH-EVFC] ("[T]he IRS 'ex-
press[ed a] sincere apology' for mistreating a conservative organization called Linchpins of
Liberty-along with 40 other conservative groups-in their applications for tax-exempt status.").
This type of controversy, arising from discretionary judgments at a granular level, is one reason it
might make sense for the Fed to outsource certain portfolio allocation decisions, as described in
Section IILA.
281 I.R.C. § 6103.
282 Murphy, supra note 273, at 513.
283 See Internal Revenue Manuals: Part 10. Security, Privacy, and Assurance, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/irm/partI0 [https://perma.cc/D7PE-VBSA].
284 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2017 ANNUAL PRIVACY, DATA MINING,
AND SECTION 803 REPORTS. 9 (2017) (describing measures implemented by the IRS, among
other departments, in privacy protection and compliance).
285 See Alan Rappeport, Will a Leak Reveal Trump's Tax Returns? Don't Hold Your




nal offenses punishable by imprisonment28 6 and civil damages, includ-
ing punitive damages.28 7 In creating a legal and logistical framework
for privacy protection, the IRS could serve as a useful model for
FedAccount. The Fed's unmatched level of administrative indepen-
dence supplies an extra layer of protection in this regard.28 8
Fourth, it bears repeating that FedAccount provides a public op-
tion. Those not comfortable with the Fed possessing their bank state-
ments need not sign up.
E. Fintech as an Alternative
Greater financial inclusion and payment efficiency are central
benefits of the FedAccount program, but one may query whether
technological advancements in the private financial sector-so-called
"Fintech"-cannot achieve similar benefits.28 9 Passively waiting for
this to happen would be unwise. Other countries have achieved im-
pressive financial inclusion and payment system efficiency without
waiting for technological solutions.290 Recent Fintech developments
have in some ways exacerbated U.S. payment system fragmentation,
and they overwhelmingly serve those who were already "banked."2 91
And even if Fintech offered meaningful improvement along these
dimensions, FedAccount offers a host of other benefits that no
Fintech solution could realistically match: bolstering financial stability,
improving monetary policy transmission, eliminating interchange fees,
promoting financial regulatory simplification, and enabling the gov-
ernment to recapture seigniorage. Although continuing Fintech inno-
vations are welcome, they should not serve as an excuse for public
policy stasis.
286 See I.R.C. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7213A (disclosure and inspection, respectively).
287 See I.R.C. § 7431 (civil damages).
288 See Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J.
REG. 257, 259 (2015) (stating that the Fed has "unique independence").
289 See, e.g., Michael Barr, Karen Gifford & Aaron Klein, Enhancing Anti-Money Launder-
ing and Financial Access: Can New Technology Achieve Both? 3 (Brookings Inst., Working Pa-
per, 2018) (exploring how Fintech might increase financial inclusion without sacrificing other
priorities in the area of cross-border payments).
290 See Demirguc-Kunt et al., supra note 51 at 83-84.
291 See, e.g., Ricks, supra note 183, at 828-36. One exception to serving the already banked
is prepaid debit cards, which have had a small but tangible impact in facilitating payment and
savings for underserved populations-though note this "innovation ... [']run[s] on old rails."'
Id. at 834-35 (quoting MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 796 (2016)).
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F. Regulation as an Alternative
Regulatory mandates are another potential way to achieve finan-
cial inclusion. In Canada, for example, banks are required to open
accounts for applicants unless an enumerated exception applies.2 92
Ninety-nine percent of Canadian households have full access to bank-
ing services.293 This would be a plausible approach to advancing finan-
cial inclusion in the United States, although fragmentation in the U.S.
banking system and the paucity of trust in banks among underserved
populations could limit the effectiveness of such a mandate.2 94 But, as
with Fintech, a regulatory mandate to serve all customers would fail to
yield the assorted other benefits of FedAccount, many of which would
be difficult or impossible to achieve through regulatory means. And
FedAccount can of course coexist with, and even complement, regula-
tory measures to improve financial inclusion.
G. Effects on Lending, Small Banks, and Financial Innovation
How would FedAccount affect private provisioning of financial
services? As noted in Section III.A, FedAccount might increase
banks' funding costs by removing distortive subsidies-but that would
be a good thing. It should be kept in mind that lending markets are
competitive. Deposit banks have no monopoly on extending credit;
they coexist with myriad other financial institutions that make loans
and buy bonds.2 95 If profitable lending opportunities exist, the market
should be expected to ferret them out. To take an extreme case, sup-
pose all bank deposits migrated to FedAccounts, and suppose the cen-
tral bank opted to gradually shift its portfolio away from discount
window credit to member banks and toward bonds purchased on the
secondary market. As this shift unfolded, private-sector bond inves-
tors-such as mutual funds-would find themselves with excess funds.
To the extent that financial markets are efficient, these funds would
make their way-directly or indirectly-to lending markets if that was
their optimal use.
Relatedly, some may be concerned that FedAccount would ad-
versely affect small banks, but there is no reason to expect any dispa-
rate impact. Large-scale migration to FedAccounts would require
292 The exceptions generally relate to fraud prevention. See Access to Basic Banking Ser-
vices Regulations, SOR/2003-184, § 3 (Can.) (issued pursuant to sections 448.1(3), 458.1(2), and
459.4 of the Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c 46 (Can.)).
293 See Demirguc-Kunt et al., supra note 51, at 83.
294 See Ricks, supra note 183, at 828-30.
295 See Ricks, supra note 183, at 779.
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large and small banks alike to seek alternative funding, and discount
window credit would be available to each. To the extent that small
bank subsidies are desired, rates on discount window credit could be
graduated. There is regulatory precedent for this; for example, U.S.
reserve requirements are graduated so as to benefit small banks.2 96
Nor is FedAccount likely to chill or undermine private sector in-
novation in financial services. Among other things, the Fed can adopt
an open application programming interface ("API") functionality that
would allow third-party developers to design applications for FedAc-
count. These applications could help account holders with their finan-
cial planning or use their transaction information to offer them
cheaper credit, for example.2 97 In fact, FedAccount would likely open
up the market and quicken innovation in the financial services space:
as it stands today, incumbent banks have little incentive to allow other
companies to build freely on their proprietary platforms and payment
systems.2 98 Finally, if private businesses can offer money-and-payment
solutions that are superior to FedAccount, there is nothing to stop
them from doing so.
H. Asset-Liability Synergies
Another potential objection to FedAccount is that it would sever
a purported synergistic link between managing customer deposit ac-
counts and lending. These arguments come in two main varieties. The
first version relates to the informational content of deposit account
usage.299 As Eugene Fama summarized the argument in 1985, "[t]he
ongoing history of a borrower as a depositor provides information
that allows a bank to identify the risks of loans to depositors and to
monitor the loans at lower cost than other lenders."300 It is unclear
how much this remains a competitive advantage of banks if it ever
really was: nonbank lenders have successfully competed against banks
for centuries, and one area where Fintech initiatives are making signif-
296 Today, U.S. reserve requirements are 0% for the first $16 million in transaction ac-
counts, then 3% for the next $106 million, and 10% thereafter. See Policy Tools: Reserve Re-
quirements, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. Sys. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm [https://perma.cc/2GFH-SDZ4]; Small banks also benefit from
less frequent on-site examinations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(4).
297 Regarding data portability, see infra Section IV.H.
298 See, e.g., Brunnermeier et al., supra note 5, at 17 ("The platform owner's disinterest in
promoting interoperability with other platforms . . . conflicts with economic efficiency.").
299 For alerting the authors to this issue and suggesting data portability as a solution, the
authors thank Luigi Zingales.
300 Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38
(1985).
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icant strides is in honing predictive credit analytics based on a pleth-
ora of data points.301 But in any case, data portability is a
straightforward solution. The Fed could provide individual account
data to lenders, with the authorization of the account holder. Euro-
pean banks are now required to provide this service on behalf of their
depositors.32 Although the United States has not yet established a
similar mandate for private organizations, FedAccount could easily in-
corporate this feature.
Second, some claim that depositors' ability to withdraw on de-
mand provides valuable discipline for managers making portfolio allo-
cation decisions.303 Although deposit insurance undermines this
supposed disciplinary function, the runnability of uninsured deposits
and other short-term debt should, in theory, inspire prudence on the
part of managers making loans. This type of "discipline," however,
comes with an astronomical cost: "[M]arket discipline by depositors is
merely another name for bank panics."304 Plenty of other techniques
for reducing agency costs and disciplining management avoid this cat-
astrophic pitfall.
301 See, e.g., Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion,
Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 3 (Rsch. Dep't, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working
Paper No. 17-17, 2017) (listing as examples of alternative data sources for Fintech lenders "infor-
mation drawn from utility payments, ... insurance claims, bank account transfers, use of mobile
phones or the Internet, and other personal data such as consumer's occupation or detail about
their education"); Issie Lapowsky, The Next Big Thing You Missed: Startup's Plan to Remake
Banks and Replace Credit Cards Just Might Work, WIRED (July 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://
www.wired.com/2014/07/affirm/ [https://perma.cc/LU4U-NWUU] (describing a Fintech startup's
goal of "rewrit[ing] the definition of personal creditworthiness with its own algorithms and credit
models, betting that tens of thousands of data points will say more about borrowers than a credit
score").
302 See Council Directive 2015/2366, arts. 36, 66, 67, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35, 79, 92-93; see also
Keri Gohman, The Data Portability Landscape is Changing Globally and the U.S. Financial Sec-
tor is Taking Notice, FORBES (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:00 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesfinancecouncil/2017/10/11/the-data-portability-landscape-is-changing-globally-and-the-u-s-
financial-sector-is-taking-notice/?sh=560aae6c47f2 [https://perma.cc/YY3E-C88V] (noting that
the European Commission's new Payment Services Directive "instructs banks to give third-party
providers access to customer data so they can deliver innovation and improvement"). The Euro-
pean Union has also enacted a more general "[r]ight to data portability" as part of its General
Data Protection Regulation. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 20, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 45.
303 E.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Struc-
turing Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 497 (1991); Douglas W. Dia-
mond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A
Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287, 321 (2001); Mark J. Flannery, Debt Maturity and the
Deadweight Cost of Leverage: Optimally Financing Banking Firms, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 320,
321-22 (1994).
304 Lowell L. Bryan, A Blueprint for Financial Reconstruction, HARV. Bus. REV.,




FedAccount requires legislation. Although existing law empow-
ers the Fed to lend to individuals and nonbank businesses,305 it does
not authorize the Fed to provide them with transaction accounts. The
required amendments would be minor. The Fed is already authorized
to maintain accounts for depository institutions as well as for the U.S.
government and certain of its instrumentalities, government-spon-
sored enterprises, and financial market utilities.306 This list should be
expanded to include all U.S. persons,307 and the Fed should be re-
quired to provide accounts to all qualifying applicants.308 Additionally,
existing law empowers the Fed to pay interest on balances maintained
"by or on behalf of a depository institution."309 This provision should
be adjusted to empower the Fed to pay interest on balances main-
tained by all U.S. persons and to require it to pay a uniform rate to all
its account holders.
Although the required legislative fixes may be minor, FedAc-
count would represent a major change in our financial and monetary
architecture. Big changes in financial architecture are politically chal-
lenging. The most pessimistic view is that they are virtually impossible
without a crisis.310 But there is reason for optimism in this case. Aside
from banks and certain shadow banking institutions whose existing
business models FedAccount would disrupt, practically every other
segment of the American economy is likely to benefit from FedAc-
count. FedAccount would offer a free public option in banking to all
U.S. residents without increasing their taxes or compelling them to
switch. It would reduce or eliminate the regressive tax on retailers and
consumers implicitly created by debit card interchange fees. FedAc-
305 12 U.S.C. § 347c.
306 See supra note 10.
307 Non-U.S. persons would continue to use private sector bank accounts, but U.S. subsidi-
aries of foreign businesses would be eligible for FedAccounts.
308 Applicants would be screened only for anti-money laundering and fraud prevention
purposes; no one would be denied an account based on profitability considerations. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
309 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(12).
310 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the
Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 56 (2014) (arguing that there is a
four-part "'Iron Law' of major U.S. financial regulation," the first of which is that "enactment is
invariably crisis driven"). But see generally Peter Conti-Brown & Michael Ohlrogge, Testing the
Crisis-Legislation Hypothesis: Citation Indexing and the Measurement of Legislative Impor-
tance (June 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://safe-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/userupload/
editorcommon/Events/Testing_theCrisisLegislationHypothesis_2020-06-09_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LAF6-ZX83] (arguing that the crisis-driven legislation theory explains the enactment
of securities laws well, but struggles to explain the enactment banking laws).
2021] 171
172 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
count would appeal to deficit hawks because in all likelihood it would
meaningfully augment the Fed's annual remittance to the Treasury by
reducing economic rents. It would also appeal to institutional inves-
tors and businesses large and small because the program would
greatly simplify cash management while offering higher interest pay-
ments on cash balances and faster payment speeds. Given these bene-
fits and others, it is easy to see how FedAccount could garner
widespread political support.
CONCLUSION
Money is an essential aspect of statecraft, and monetary dysfunc-
tion has played a persistent and crucial role in U.S. history, not to
mention the histories of other countries and eras.311 From "not worth
a Continental," to the Founders' knock-down battles over a national
bank, to President Jackson's Bank War and veto message, to green-
backs and the Legal Tender Cases,3 1 2 to the Populist free-silver move-
ment and William Jennings Bryan's "cross of gold" speech, to the
upheavals of the Great Depression ("a tragic testimonial to the impor-
tance of monetary forces," per Friedman and Schwartz313), to the rise
of shadow moneys, the panic of 2008, excruciating bailouts, the Great
Recession, and the political convulsions that followed314-monetary
affairs have been central to our history and politics.
A better approach is now within reach. FedAccount would
reshape the sovereign "account money" system into an open access
resource, just like the sovereign physical currency system. The effects
would be transformative along multiple dimensions. And one final ad-
vantage deserves mention. For most Americans, the central bank is an
obscure and remote institution to which they feel little if any connec-
tion. With FedAccount, people would experience this organ of gov-
ernment working directly for them. FedAccount could play some role,
however modest, in restoring Americans' faith that the government
can make a positive difference in their daily lives. This would be no
small accomplishment.
311 For a profound treatment of the emergence and fitful evolution of monetary institutions
in medieval and early modern England, see generally DESAN, supra note 154.
312 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
313 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 99, at 300.
314 See Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, Going to Extremes: Polit-
ics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014, 88 EUR. ECON. REV. 227, 233 (2016).
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